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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Human Capital, Health, and Development
by
Yao Yao
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Professor Ping Wang, Chair
This dissertation studies rich lifecycle behavior concerning human capital and health, and
its implications for economic growth and development. It examines the impact of social
institutions and government policies on individuals’ lifetime choices which affect public health
outcomes and economy-wide labor productivity. I apply macroeconomic approach and focus
on aggregate effects, but both theoretical framework and quantitative analysis are built upon
solid micro foundations of household behavior. By exploring the underlying channels, I derive
policy implications for economic growth and development. This dissertation consists of three
chapters. Chapter 1 studies the role of fertility motives in women’s HIV risk in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Chapter 2 studies the impact of higher education expansion along with economic
reform on China’s labor productivity, and Chapter 3 explores patterns of China’s regional
income disparity.
Chapter 1 examines the role of social and cultural norms regarding fertility in women’s
HIV risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility, or the ability to bear children, is highly valued
in most African societies, and premarital fertility is often encouraged in order to facilitate
marriage. This, however, increases women’s exposure to HIV risk by increasing unprotected
premarital sexual activity. I construct a lifecycle model that relates a woman’s decisions
concerning sex, fertility and education to HIV risk. The model is calibrated to match Kenyan
women’s data on fertility, marriage and HIV prevalence. Quantitative results show that
viii
fertility motives play a substantial role in women’s, especially young women’s, HIV risk.
If premarital births did not facilitate marriage, the HIV prevalence rate of young women
in Kenya would be one-third lower. Policies that subsidize income, education, and HIV
treatment are evaluated.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of higher education expansion, along with economic reform
of the state sector, in the late 1990’s in China on its labor productivity. I argue that in
an economy such as China, where allocation distortions widely exist, an educational policy
affects average labor productivity not only through its effect on human capital stock, but
also through its effect on human capital allocation across sectors. Thus, its impact could be
very limited if misallocation becomes more severe following the policy. I construct a two-
sector general equilibrium model with private enterprises (PE) and state-owned enterprises
(SOE), with policy distortions favoring the latter. Households, heterogeneous in ability,
make educational choices and occupational choices in a three-period overlapping-generations
setting. Counterintuitively, quantitative analysis shows an overall negative effect of higher
education expansion on average labor productivity (by 5 percent). Though it did increase
China’s skilled human capital stock significantly (by nearly 50 percent), the policy had the
effect of reallocating relatively more human capital toward the less-productive state sector.
It is the economic reform that greatly improves the efficiency of human capital allocation
and complements educational policy in enhancing labor productivity (by nearly 50 percent).
Chapter 3 explores patterns of China’s regional income disparity. I document the stylized
fact that the regional labor income disparity varies across industries with different skill in-
tensities in China. While high-skill-intensive industries have larger income dispersions across
regions than low-skill-intensive ones, this pattern tends to intensify over recent decades. I
construct a model that interprets this pattern using the regional productivity variation of
high-skilled firms, match-specific ability, firms’ screening decision and workers’ migration. In
particular, firms in rich regions have higher productivity than those in poor regions. Workers
are heterogeneous in ability, which is match-specific and unobservable before screening. Since
ix
ability and productivity are complements for high-skilled firms, these firms in rich regions
pay more screening efforts to select workers with higher ability, and pay a higher wage in
equilibrium. Workers live in different regions, and migration incurs a cost. This increases la-
bor market tightness in rich regions and amplifies the regional income disparity. The model is
quantified to match China’s data. Counterfactual analysis shows that the screening process
accounts for 45 percent of China’s regional income disparity of high-skill-intensive industries,
and migration barrier accounts for 10 percent.
x
Chapter 1: Fertility and HIV Risk in Africa
This chapter examines the role of social and cultural norms regarding fertility in women’s HIV
risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility, or the ability to bear children, is highly valued in most
African societies, and premarital fertility is often encouraged in order to facilitate marriage.
This, however, increases women’s exposure to HIV risk by increasing unprotected premarital
sexual activity. I construct a lifecycle model that relates a woman’s decisions concerning sex,
fertility and education to HIV risk. The model is calibrated to match Kenyan women’s data
on fertility, marriage and HIV prevalence. Quantitative results show that fertility motives
play a substantial role in women’s, especially young women’s, HIV risk. If premarital births
did not facilitate marriage, the HIV prevalence rate of young women in Kenya would be one-
third lower. Policies that subsidize income, education, and HIV treatment are evaluated.
1.1 Introduction
HIV is a major health risk facing young women in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Premarital
sex is arguably the leading cause of their infection. However, it is documented that behavior
response to HIV risk is limited in Africa, which is especially true for young adults1. It is
therefore of critical importance to understand what influences risky behavior and what is the
obstacle to behavior change. In this paper, I explore the role of social and cultural norms
regarding fertility played in African women’s HIV risk. In particular, I examine how African
women’s motives to bear premarital children may affect their HIV infection.
Fertility, or the ability to bear children, is highly valued in most African societies. Moth-
erhood is important for women’s social status and is an essential component of married
women’s identity. In many cultures, childless women suffer discrimination, stigma and os-
tracism (Sembuya, 2010). For unmarried women, premarital fertility is often encouraged in
order to facilitate marriage.
Since unmarried women who want to marry a man compete with his other girl-
1Oster (2012) reviews the literature and finds that the limited behavior change can be partially explained
by bias in OLS estimates and low non-HIV life expectancy in Africa, but these explanations apply to married
people only.
1
friends they may need to prove that they will be able to have children. In many African
societies the birth of the first child is customarily considered an essential step in the
development of a marriage ... Consequently, some women are expected to have children
before marriage in order to prove their fertility to their future husband; others favour
premarital pregnancy hoping that marriage will follow. (Meekers and Calvès, 1997)
Strong incentives to bear children intensify women’s exposure to HIV infection by increas-
ing unprotected sexual activities. The risk of these activities increases if they are premarital,
a time when men commonly have several partners and are less committed to the relationship.
Indeed, overlapping sexual relations are considered to be a major cause of the severity of
the HIV epidemic in Africa (Epstein and Morris, 2011). Unprotected sex also enhances the
chance of other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) which are found to increase the HIV
transmission rate dramatically (Oster, 2005).
To check the validity of this hypothesis, I apply Kenyan women’s data from the De-
mographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and find that a woman who has a premarital birth
is 3-6 percentage points more likely to be HIV infected, which is significant compared to
Kenyan women’s average HIV rate of about 8 percent. In addition, my results suggest that
better-educated and wealthier women are less likely to have premarital births, suggesting a
reduction of the infection risk for advantaged women through the fertility channel.
Taking the observations delineated above into account, I construct a lifecycle model that
relates a woman’s lifetime decisions concerning sex, fertility and education to HIV risk. The
key ingredients of the model are as follows. A woman values consumption and children,
and decides her sex type between committed and casual, the number of children to bear
before and after marriage, and the fraction of time allocated to education versus work. Her
income comes from labor income and transfers from her sexual partner. Marriage brings
more income through transfers, and HIV infection lowers life expectancy and productivity.
The premarital fertility decision is crucial in this model and has both positive and negative
effects. On the one hand, having more children not only brings more happiness, but also
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increases the arrival rate of marriage. On the other hand, childrearing incurs time costs to
both work and education, and the efforts to get pregnant amplify the HIV infection risk by
increasing unprotected premarital sex. The sex-type choice between casual and committed
sex also affects income, marriage and HIV risk. Being involved in casual sexual relationships
delays marriage and increases HIV risk compared to committed sex. But it brings a fixed
amount of transfers from the partner. In contrast, transfers from the partner in a committed
relationship are proportional to the woman’s own labor income2. Hence, casual sex may be
more appealing than committed sex if the woman’s own labor income is very low.
I allow women to be heterogeneous in their efficacy of human capital accumulation and
their preference for children, and then the model has the following implications for women’s
behavior. First, women who are more efficient in human capital accumulation tend to have
fewer children before and after marriage, since children incur more opportunity costs. Thus
they are married at a later age. These women are also more likely to be engaged in casual
sex, as long as the costs in terms of HIV risk and marriage delay are not too high. This
is because their labor income is very low when they are young, a time when they choose
to spend more time at school. For them casual sex is a means of smoothing consumption
over the lifecycle. Second, women who have higher preference for children tend to have
more premarital children and hence are married earlier. They are also more likely to choose
committed sex which complements premarital births in facilitating marriage.
The model is calibrated to match the data from Kenyan DHS. In particular, I catego-
rize women by their education efficacy and preference for children, and solve their lifetime
decisions numerically. The calibrated model matches data on births, marriage age and HIV
prevalence for women of both high- and low-educated groups very well. Furthermore, I
conduct counterfactual experiments regarding fertility motives and policy experiments of
subsidizing income, education, and HIV treatment. For each type of subsidy, I also exper-
iment on the sources of funding, say, the tax revenue from labor income tax or lump-sum
2I assume that committed relationships are assortative matching.
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tax (internal funding), and the international support (external funding). I conduct revenue-
neutral exercises by fixing the total amount of funding to be the same for all experiments.
Counterfactual experiments show a substantial role of fertility motives in HIV risk for
women, especially young women. First, if premarital births did not facilitate marriage, the
HIV prevalence rate of all women in Kenya (aged 15-49) would be reduced from 8.0 percent to
6.5 percent, and that of young women (aged 15-24) would be reduced from 6.6 percent to 4.4
percent. The result is similar if women’s preference for children was set to be close to the US
level. This is mainly due to a reduction of premarital births. Second, even though the HIV
transmission rate was reduced by two-thirds, the role of fertility behavior in HIV prevalence
is considerable. The number of premarital children would be increased by about 30 percent
in response to the lowered HIV transmission rate, and young women’s HIV prevalence rate
would be reduced to 4.3 percent. However, it would be reduced to 2.2 percent if fertility
behavior was not allowed to change.
Through the policy experiments, I find that among the three types of subsidies, the
education subsidy is the most effective in reducing premarital fertility and young women’s
HIV rate, since subsidizing education raises the opportunity costs of premarital childrearing.
The HIV treatment subsidy is the most effective in reducing the average HIV rate of all
women since the treatment is also an effective means of prevention. But it is not as effective in
reducing the HIV rate of young women as the education subsidy, because it incentivizes them
to have more premarital children which cause lower risk to their health now. The income
subsidy has little effect on HIV prevalence even though it disincentivizes early marriage,
since more income allows women to have more premarital children due to the income effect.
External funds are more effective than internal funds in reducing the HIV rate, because
tax lowers women’s income, and incentivizes them either to bear more premarital children to
facilitate marriage, or to stick to casual sex. Internal funds with labor income tax is the least




This paper is first related to the literature of the relationship between HIV and fertility. Re-
search has looked at the effect of HIV on fertility, as the latter influences long-run economic
growth by affecting population size. For example, Fortson (2009) constructs estimates of
regional total fertility rate over time of SSA countries using data from the DHS, and he finds
that fertility response to the HIV epidemic in SSA is insignificant. Juhn et al. (2013) find
that although HIV infection significantly lowers an individual woman’s fertility, local com-
munity HIV prevalence has little effect on non-infected women’s fertility. On the contrary,
Young (2005, 2007) finds large negative fertility responses to the HIV epidemic in Africa that
contribute to welfare improvement in the long run. Kalemli-Ozcan (2008), however, finds a
positive effect of HIV/AIDS on fertility in Africa in a cross-sectional, country-level frame-
work. Sociological and medical literature shows that many HIV-infected men and women
still intend to have children, despite the health risk imposed on their partners, children and
themselves (Cooper, et al., 2007; Paiva et al., 2003; Myer, et al, 2007; Nakayiwa et al., 2006;
Nattabi, et al., 2009; Smith and Mbakwem, 2007; Peltzer et al., 2009). Although they do not
examine the reverse effect, these studies, in general, indicate strong and pervasive fertility
motives in Africa that affect behavior.
These studies, however, are subject to the reverse causality problem by ignoring the effects
of people’s fertility choice on their HIV risk. In contrast, I argue that not only does HIV affect
fertility, but also HIV is an endogenous outcome of women’s fertility choice. Furthermore,
under my framework, fertility behavior affects HIV infection not only through its effect on
sexual behavior, but also through its interactions with human capital accumulation and labor
income status.
This paper is also related to the strand of literature that investigates socioeconomic fac-
tors that affect the HIV epidemic in Africa. For instance, economic activities such as exports
(Oster, 2012) and migration (Corno and de Walque, 2012) are found to be positively associ-
ated with HIV prevalence due to the increasing concurrent sexual contacts by movements of
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people. On the high HIV infection rate among young African women, it is argued that trans-
actional sex among young adults (Epstein, 2007) and premarital sexual relations (Meekers
and Calvès, 1997) expose young women to high risk. Spousal search behavior, which leads
to a frequent partner turnover before marriage, increases young women’s HIV risk in South
Africa (Magruder, 2011). Using a fidelity network model, Pongou and Serrano (2013) argue
that the gender gap of HIV rates in Africa can be simply explained by the configuration of
sexual networks. Nonetheless, Oster (2012) documents that despite the high HIV rates and
corresponding high mortality risk associated with risky sexual behavior, behavior response
has been limited. She proposes that this can be partially explained by bias in OLS estimates
and low non-HIV life expectancy in Africa, but her explanation applies to married people
only. The lack of behavior response among young women remains an open issue.
Much of the literature studying the relationship between HIV and education or wealth
does so empirically. The results are mixed, though most support a positive relationship due
to the positive association between education and premarital sex. Using data of five SSA
countries from the DHS, Fortson (2008) finds a positive relationship between education level
and HIV rates in most sample countries. de Walque (2009), however, finds no correlation
between the two when adding more controls using the same dataset. Alsan and Cutler
(2013) attribute the rapid HIV decline in Uganda in the early 1990s to the rise in female
secondary school enrollment that increased the likelihood of abstaining from sex. Duflo et al.
(2015) evaluate HIV interventions in Kenyan schools and find that education subsidies, while
reducing teenage pregnancies, do not reduce STIs since they do not affect casual sex. Thus
they argue that distinguishing committed sex and casual sex is important for understanding
policy effects on teen pregnancy and STIs. Case and Paxson (2013) argue that the effect
of education on HIV infection depends on the availability of knowledge about HIV: when
knowledge of HIV was unknown, regions with higher rates of female education had more
prevalent nonmarital adolescent sexual activity and have higher HIV rates. Some other
studies (e.g., de Walque, 2007; Lorio and Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 2011) incorporate a time-
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varing dimension to the analysis of the education gradient and find a dynamic relationship
between HIV and education over time or over AIDS epidemic stages.
The lack of consensus on the relationship between HIV and education suggests that the
channels through which education is associated with HIV is unclear. In this paper, I provide
a framework in which education is associated with HIV through a fertility channel and a
sex-type channel. Under the mechanism of this framework, better-educated women have a
longer history of premarital sex and are more likely to choose casual sex, which increases
their HIV exposure, but they tend to reduce early pregnancy, which reduces their HIV risk,
all of which are consistent with the empirical findings in the literature. The overall effect of
education on HIV remains a quantitative issue. Moreover, I find that even though better-
educated women have fewer premarital births, their behavior is also strongly influenced by
fertility motives.
In terms of methodology, Greenwood et al. (2013) offer the first quantitative general
equilibrium model of disease transmission with rational decision making. In their paper,
they model markets of different types of sexual activities and allow monetary transfers that
clear the markets. Males and females make rational choices about risky sexual behavior
based on beliefs about its riskiness. Prior to their paper, most economic research on HIV
adopts empirical methods, including field experiments (e.g., Duflo et al., 2015; Godlonton
et al., 2014; Thornton, 2008). The few formal models of risky behavior and HIV/AIDS that
exist are more mechanic (e.g., Kremer, 1996; Magruder, 2011). There is a large literature on
HIV/AIDS transmission in epidemiology, but they do not model decision-making and take
sexual behavior as exogenously given (see a review in Greenwood et al. 2013).
My paper adds to the relatively thin literature of modeling rational decision-making
related to disease transmission. I offer a much richer framework than most other studies
in the literature. Moreover, unlike Greenwood et al. (2013) who mainly model sexual
behavior based on updated beliefs about its riskiness, I model more fundamental channels
such as fertility and human capital accumulation that intensely interact with sex decisions.
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With this framework, I conduct policy experiments that are less stylized. In Greenwood
et al. (2013), policy experiments are conducted by directly changing the value of certain
parameters, for instance, the odds of infection. On the contrary, I start with the funding for
policies and show how different use of the same amount of funding has different effects on
behavior and HIV prevalence.
Finally, this paper is related to the broader literature of demographic transition and eco-
nomic development. In particular, it is linked to the fertility literature of quality-quantity
tradeoff and the scant literature of birth timing. Empirical studies find a clear negative
relationship between income and fertility (e.g., Jones and Tertilt, 2008). A common inter-
pretation is that the price of children is largely time, and hence children are more expensive
for parents with higher income who have a higher demand for child quality, making quantity
more costly (e.g., Becker, 1960; Easterlin, 1968; Barro and Becker, 1989; Becker, Murphy
and Tamura, 1990; Wang, Yip and Scotese, 1994). The birth-timing literature mostly focuses
on the relationship between fertility decisions of birth timing and income, employment and
human capital accumulation. A general finding is that higher income or better education
delays births (Happel, Hill and Low, 1984; Cigno and Ermisch, 1989; Conesa, 2002; Iyigun,
2000; Caucutt, Guner and Knowles, 2001; Mullin and Wang, 2002; Heckman and Walker,
1990a, b; Bloemen and Kalwij, 2001; Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2008; Tsay and Chu, 2005). An-
other bulk of research focus on teenage births and the marital status of women at the time
of birth (e.g., Hoynes, 1997). However, most existing models in the literature only allow
binary or a small number of discrete decisions regarding fertility, and do not allow women to
optimize in a dynamic setting with interactions of multiple decisions. In contrast, my model
allows women to decide the number of children before and after marriage, which, combined
with education and sex type choices, affects income, marriage, and health.
To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature by proposing a new angle of HIV
risk components in Africa rooted in social and cultural norms regarding fertility. I offer
a rich, dynamic framework of a lifetime setting in which women’s sex, fertility, education
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and HIV infection are interrelated. This framework incorporates different channels of HIV
infection, say, a fertility channel and a sex-type channel, which work differently for women
with different education levels. This is the first paper that evaluates the effects of both
channels on HIV risk under a theoretical framework. Furthermore, this paper has important
policy implications. My results suggest that it is important for policy makers to take social
factors, such as fertility motives, into account to make HIV intervention programs more
effective. Moreover, I compare the effects of different policies by fixing the total amount
of funding. This is highly relevant to reality since SSA countries are generally resource
constrained and utilizing the funds is a critical issue.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the background about HIV and
fertility in Africa, and shows evidence of the relationship between the two in Kenya. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 presents calibration, followed by quantitative analysis in
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Background and Evidence
1.2.1 HIV and fertility background in Africa
HIV/AIDS is a major cause of death, currently killing about 2 million people worldwide each
year. The most affected continent is Africa. It is estimated that more than 24 million people
are living with HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa, and more than 1 million people die for AIDS-
related cause each year, accounting for about 70 percent of all people living with HIV and of
all AIDS deaths (UNAIDS, 2014). Unlike many western countries where HIV transmissions
occur largely through male-to-male sexual contact and drug use, in Africa the principle mode
of transmission is heterosexual contact, and most of the infected population is female.
Young women are particularly vulnerable to HIV infection compared to young men. HIV
prevalence rate of young women (15-24 years old) in SSA is 3.2 percent, while that of young
men is 1.5 percent (1990-2013 average. UNAIDS, 2014). This number has large variation
across countries3. My study spotlights one part of Africa: Kenya, where HIV prevalence rate
3For example, it is 4.1 versus 2.4 in Uganda, 7.8 versus 4.2 in Malawi, 11.5 versus 6.3 in Botswana, and
12.3 versus 6.8 in Swaziland.
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is about 7.4 percent (that of women is about 8.6 percent), higher than the average of SSA
countries (about 5 percent), and the HIV rate of young women is about 4.3 percent, versus
1.5 percent of young men.
The HIV determinant this paper highlights is fertility. Fertility is highly valued in most
African societies, and is a major means for women to achieve higher social status. Africa’s
fertility rate is much higher than many other parts of the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the
fertility rate is 4.9 births per woman, far above the US level of 1.9 (World Bank).
Fertility and marriage are closely linked. A woman acquires an identity through marriage
and, most importantly, when marriage is fertile. Inability to have children may lead to divorce
or extra-marital relationships (polygamy). For unmarried women, premarital births are
often encouraged to prove women’s fertility and to facilitate marriage. However, premarital
pregnancy is always risky, since not all births result in marriage and infidelity of men is even
more common (Meekers and Calvès, 1997). In Kenya, nearly half of women who have children
had their first pregnancy before the first marriage, and only about half of them had marriage
follow within one year after pregnancy (the DHS for Kenya, or KDHS, 2008-2009)4. Better-
educated women have lower premarital fertility rate. Women who have secondary school
or higher education have an average of 0.74 pregnancies before marriage, while those with
primary school or lower education have 1.19 on average (KDHS, 2008-2009).
Premarital sexual and fertility behavior also largely depends on ethnicity and religion.
While some ethnic groups have premarital sexual relations freely permitted and subject to no
sanctions, others insist on virginity and prohibit premarital sexual behavior (Murdock, 1967).
Consequently, the prevalence of premarital fertility has large variation across ethnic groups
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Garenne and Zwang, 2006)5. Kenya is a country where prevalence
4Premarital pregnancy is computed from the KDHS data using year and month of the first birth and age
at the first union. Due to the way of computation, the number of premarital pregnancies is a lower bound
estimation since miscarriages and abortions are not accounted.
5Using the DHS data of 25 SSA countries, Garenne and Zwang (2006) study the relationship between
premarital fertility and ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa. They find that the prevalence of premarital fertility,
defined as the proportion of women who had premarital births, varies considerably among the 263 ethnic
groups examined, from 0.1 percent (Kanem-Bornou in Chad) to 76.2 percent (Herero in Namibia).
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of premarital fertility is about 24 percent, about the median level of SSA countries. The
prevalence of premarital fertility in Kenya varies substantially across ethnic groups, from 8.0
percent in Somali to 31.7 percent in Kamba (1989-2008, KDHS, computed by the author of
the current paper).
Surprisingly, despite the high fertility rate in Africa, infertility is viewed as an important
health issue in many African countries. In the so called “African infertility belt” that stretches
across central Africa from Tanzania in the east to Gabon in the west, the infertility rate
exceeds 30 percent in some countries (World Health Organization, 2003a)6. Major causes
of infertility include sexually transmitted infections (STIs), pregnancy complications and
unsafe abortion practices, which are aggravated by poverty and substandard medical care
(Cates et al., 1985). Although men and women have the same rates of infertility biologically,
the social burden falls disproportionately on women. A woman may be forced to divorce or
enter polygamy if she failed to conceive with her husband. The high infertility rates and
social burdens of infertility imposed on unconceived couples in Africa provide the rationale
for social expectations of women to prove their fertility before marriage.
1.2.2 Evidence
In this section, I show evidence on the relationship between HIV infection, premarital fertil-
ity, education and wealth in Kenya. I use data from the DHS for Kenya (KDHS). The surveys
provide household and individual level data, which includes women’s sexual behavior, mar-
riage, births history and other personal information7. Table 1.1 summarizes statistics of the
6There are two types of infertility – primary infertility and secondary infertility. The former refers
to couples who have not become pregnant after at least one year having sex without using birth control
methods. The latter refers to couples who have been able to get pregnant at least once, but now are unable.
Primary infertility rate is about 3 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and do not vary much across countries.
Most infertility in Africa is secondary infertility which varies substantially across countries, and it exceeds
30 percent in some countries. According to Larsen (2000) who adopts a stricter demographic definition of
infertility, Kenya’s infertility rate of women aged 20-44 is 16 percent, slightly below the median of 28 sample
countries.
7I choose data of Kenya for two main reasons. First, Kenya is representative in the context of this research.
Kenya’s average HIV rate during 1990-2013 is about 7.4 percent (USAIDS, 2014), above the average of SSA
countries. The proportion of Kenyan women who have premarital births is about 24 percent, about the
median of SSA countries. Second, the refusing rate of HIV test in Kenya is relatively low (13 percent for
2003 and 8.5 percent for 2008), which reduces the potential selection bias problem. I also run regressions
using data of other countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Swaziland, and most results are qualitatively and
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key variables using KDHS (2008). Below I show the main evidence, while leaving details of
the regressions and data to the Appendix A.
First, I examine the relationship between HIV status and premarital births. Table 1.2
shows the results8. It can be seen that in most specifications the coefficients of premarital
births are positive and significant (mostly at 1 percent significance level). The magnitude is
also large: a woman who has a premarital birth is 3-6 percentage points more likely to be
HIV infected, which is significant compared to Kenya’s HIV rate of about 7.4 percent and
women’s HIV rate of 8 percent. This indicates a substantial impact of premarital fertility
motives on women’s HIV infection risk.
I also conduct regressions using two subsamples. The first subsample includes only women
who had premarital sex, and the second excludes commercial sex9. The results are shown
in Table 1.3 and 1.4. It can be seen that the coefficients of premarital births are again
significant and positive in all specifications, and the marginal effect is about 3-7 percentage
points.
In addition, I examine the relationship between education, wealth, and premarital births,
and Table 1.5 shows the results. As can be seen, more education is associated with lower
premarital fertility, which is consistent for both education measures. Wealthier women are
also less likely to have premarital births in all specifications. While not displayed in this
table, women whose husbands have more wives and whose rank among the wives is lower
are more likely to have premarital births.
In summary, casual empirical results shows that women who have premarital births are
quantitatively similar.
8The coefficients displayed are transformed to marginal effects computed at the sample mean, so as the
results below. I also examine the relationship between HIV status and premarital pregnancy and the results
are very similar.
9I use the first subsample because in some regions or ethnic groups, premarital sexual behavior is pro-
hibitive, and women are married at an early age, sometimes even before 15. This makes premarital births
almost impossible. I exclude this group of women since the fertility motives focused in this paper are less
relevant to them. The reason for using the second subsample is that female commercial sex workers may
have a high chance to have premarital births due to high frequency of sexual activities and possibly higher
pay if the sex had no protection. Their premarital births are very likely unwilling outcomes and are not
relevant to the fertility motives underscored in this paper.
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3-6 percentage points more likely to be HIV infected, and women who are better-educated
or wealthier are less likely to have premarital births.
1.3 A Lifecycle Model
In this section, I construct a continuous-time lifecycle model that relates a woman’s decisions
concerning sexual behavior, fertility decision and education investment to HIV risk. A woman
values consumption and children, and chooses sex type, the number of pre- and post-marital
children, and education time to optimize her lifetime utility. Sexual relationships bring her
transfers from the partner, and children incur time costs to work and education. During her
lifetime, she may get married, which brings her more transfers from the partner. She may
also be HIV infected, which lowers her life expectancy and productivity. Premarital births
facilitate marriage, but increase HIV risk. Casual sex delays marriage and increases HIV risk
compared to committed sex, but may bring more transfers from the partner if the woman’s
own labor income is very low.
1.3.1 Model setup
Time is continuous. It starts from a woman’s beginning of fertile age (F ), and ends at the
death date (D). A woman values her consumption and children. At the beginning of her
fertile life, she decides the total number of children to give birth to during her life (n), the
number of children before marriage (n1), and sex type (s, committed or casual). At each





[ln(c) + ✓ln(1 + n1 + n2 · 1(M))   ln(1 + n1) · (1  1(M))]e ⇢tdt (1.1)
where n2 is the number of children after marriage (i.e., n2 = n  n1), 1(M) is the indicator
of being married, and ⇢ is the discount factor. ✓ measures her preference for children relative
to her preference for consumption, and   measures the disutility cost of premarital children
due to the negative social aspect of premarital fertility11. I assume that once one is married,
10I assume that women start sexual activities from the beginning of their fertile age. So there is no choice
between abstinence or not.
11The disutility cost of premarital children is a reduced form of another aspect of the social norm of
13
she will not divorce or separate, that is, marriage lasts until her death.
A woman maximizes her utility subject to the following conditions.
The budget constraint:
c+  y(n1 + n2 · 1(M)) = y + x (1.2)
Women are hand-to-mouth12. Their living costs come from two sources: consumption and
childrearing. The childrearing cost is modeled as a fraction   of the labor income per child,
as literature shows that childrearing costs are largely time costs. y is one’s labor income at
time t if she had no children and x is the transfer she gets from her sexual partner. y and x
are determined as follows.
y = wh(1  q)(1  ⌘ · 1(I)) (1.3)
where w is the hourly wage per efficient unit of labor, h is one’s human capital, q is the
fraction of time allocated to education and thus 1   q is the fraction of time to work, ⌘ is






x0 · (1  1(M)) + wh(1  q)('0 + 'M) · 1(M), if s = 0 (casual sex)
wh(1  q)('0 + 'M · 1(M)), if s = 1 (committed sex)
(1.4)
that is, there are two types of transfers from one’s sexual partner depending on the sex
type she chose. If she chose casual sex, she gets a constant transfer x0 before marriage
regardless of her own income status, and a proportion ('0 + 'M) of her own labor income
after marriage (assuming marriage is an assortative matching). If she chose committed sex,
she is matched to a partner assortatively and receive a proportion '0 of her own labor
income before marriage, which increases by a proportion 'M after marriage. I assume that
the sex type decision is only relevant before marriage – once married, the woman always has
premarital fertility. In particular, a woman faces risk when bearing premarital children, say, there is a
possibility that she would be abandoned by her partner after her pregnancy or child birth. In this case, her
reputation may be hurt as premarital fertility can be a signal of flighty sexual behavior, which would also
hurt her future marital prospect.
12I abstract from asset accumulation decision in this setting for simplicity which is also relevant to African
women many of whom live around the poverty line and do not have much savings.
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committed sex.
Finally, human capital accumulation are determined by
ḣ =  qh[1   (n1 + n2 · 1(M))](1  ⌘ · 1(I)) (1.5)
which depends on  , efficacy of human capital accumulation, q, the fraction of time allocated
to education, the number of children (n1 before marriage and n = n1 + n2 after marriage),
and her HIV status. Childrearing costs to education also appears as time costs (a fraction  
per child). In particular, it is the custom in Africa that one would be expelled from school
upon pregnancy or the child birth, hence   is expected to be large. Moreover, HIV infection
reduces one’s productivity of education by a percentage ⌘.
There are three important events in one’s life that arrive at Poisson arrival rates, and
there is no particular order for them.
One is marriage (M), the arrival rate of which is determined by
 M =  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s) · (1  1(M)) (1.6)
that is, premarital children increase the arrival rate of marriage, and casual sex reduces the
chance of marriage due to flawed reputation.
The second one is HIV infection which is determined by
 I =  I [1 + n
 
1 · (1  1(M))][1 + (1  s) · (1  1(M))] (1.7)
that is, premarital fertility and casual sex increase the probability of HIV infection. Even
if one has no premarital births and chooses committed sex, she is still subject to the risk
(with the arrival rate  I) since her partner may be infected. I abstract from more sources of
HIV risk during postmarital periods since this paper focuses on HIV of young women and
premarital behavior.
The last one is the death arrival at the rate  D if one is not HIV infected and  A if one
is infected ( A >  D).
1.3.2 Model characterization
In the model economy, a woman’s problem is to choose her fertility n and n1, sex type s
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and fraction of time for education q to maximize her lifetime utility given by equation (1.1)
subject to the budget constraint and human capital accumulation given by equations (1.2)
- (1.5), taking marriage and HIV risk into account.
There are two binary state variables (m, i) corresponding to marriage and HIV status
(there is another state variable – sex type s when premarital), and three continuous state
variables (h, n, n1). Therefore, there are four possible (binary) states in a woman’s life re-
garding marriage and HIV status: (M, I), (M, I), ( M, I), ( M, I). The HJB equations
of the four states are as follows13.
⇢V (h|M, I;n, n1) = maxq{ln(c) + ✓ln(1 + n)
+  A[ V (h|M, I;n, n1)] +
@V (h|M, I;n, n1)
@h
· ḣ} (1.8)
⇢V (h|M, I;n, n1) = maxq{ln(c) + ✓ln(1 + n)
+  I [V (h|M, I;n, n1)  V (h|M, I;n, n1)]




⇢V (h| M, I;n, n1, s) = maxq{ln(c) + (✓    )ln(1 + n1)
+  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s)[V (h|M, I;n, n1, s)  V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)]
+  A[ V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)] +
@V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)
@h
· ḣ} (1.10)
13Note that in this model, death arrives at a constant arrival rate  D which is independent of women’s
age, so there is no term @V@t in the HJB equations.
On the notation of binary states, M (I) represents the state of being married (HIV-infected), and  M
( I) represents the state of being unmarried (non-infected)
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⇢V (h| M, I;n, n1, s) = maxq{ln(c) + (✓    )ln(1 + n1)
+  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s)[V (h|M, I;n, n1, s)  V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)]
+  I(1 + n
 
1 )(1 + (1  s))[V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)  V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)]
+  D[ V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)] +
@V (h| M, I;n, n1, s)
@h
· ḣ} (1.11)
Equations (1.8) – (1.11) say that when one is in state (M, I) she is only possible to change
into the state of death (equation (1.8)); when she is in state (M, I), she may change into
HIV infection state with an arrival rate  I or death (equation (1.9)); when she is in state
( M, I), she may get married with an arrival rate  M(1 + ↵n1)(1 + ⇣s) or die (equation
(1.10)); and when she is in state ( M, I), she may enter marriage, be HIV infected or die
(equation (1.11)).
The Bellman equations (1.8)-(1.11) can be used to characterize the choice of education
time q. For example, by taking first order condition of equation (1.8) one gets:
1
h(1  q) =
@V (h|M, I;n, n1)
@h
·  (1  ⌘)(1   n) (1.12)
which says that suppose @V (h|M,I;n,n1)
@h
is fixed, then q increases in education efficacy  , and
decreases in productivity drop due to HIV ⌘ and the number of children n. This is intuitive
since the higher the education efficacy, the more beneficial is the time spent on education;
the more productivity drop due to HIV, the less does one benefit from education; the more
children one has, the less efficient are both work and education. The characterizations of q
of other states are similar.
The fertility decision is more complicated since it needs to be solved back to the beginning
of one’s life and there is no analytical solution to the value functions. But qualitatively it
is affected by the following factors. First, the benefit and cost of children are happiness
they bring about versus childrearing costs. For the former, higher income increases fertility
since children can be viewed as normal goods (i.e., the income effect). But for the latter,
since childrearing costs are time costs, women with higher education efficacy ( ) (hence
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higher potential labor income) would have fewer children due to higher opportunity costs
of childrearing (i.e., the substitution effect). Second, the choice of premarital children has
some additional effects. The additional benefit is that premarital births facilitate the arrival
of marriage, and the additional costs are that they increase the chance of HIV infection, and
incur a disutility cost. Hence, women with higher education efficacy may also have fewer
premarital children due to higher opportunity costs of childrearing, as long as the costs of
marriage delay is not too high. Finally, the higher chance do premarital births bring about
marriage (i.e., higher ↵), the more premarital children would women have. The more likely
do they cause HIV infection (i.e., higher  ), the more costly is HIV (i.e., higher ⌘ or  A),
or the more disutility does premarital fertility incur (i.e., higher  ), the fewer premarital
children would be delivered by women.
The sex type decision is also made at the beginning of life and is affected by the following.
The benefit of casual sex is that it brings more current transfers from the partner when
the woman’s labor income is so low that the proportional transfers from her partner in a
committed relationship are lower than what she makes in a casual relationship. The cost
is that it delays marriage due to flawed reputation and increases HIV risk. Therefore,
a woman with higher education efficacy (i.e., higher  ) may choose casual sex since she
receives less from a committed relationship when she spends much time in school and has
low labor income (hence low transfers proportional to her own income). But she may also
choose committed sex if casual sex delayed marriage by so much that she would lost more
(proportional) transfers from marriage when she has accumulated enough human capital
and spends more time on working (thus has higher labor income). Moreover, premarital
children and committed sex are complements in facilitating marriage (see equation (1.6)),
hence women who have more premarital children are more likely to choose committed sex,
ceteris paribus.
1.4 Calibration
I calibrate the model based on Kenyan women’s data from the DHS (2008). I group all
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women aged 15-49 into four categories depending on their education efficacy ( H and  L)
and preference for children (✓H and ✓L), hence there are two-by-two categories in total. The
former is determined by education level which is secondary school or higher ( H) versus
primary school or lower ( L), with a population ratio of 1/2 based on the KDHS (2008).
The latter is determined by the number of children (i.e., a larger number of children reveals
higher preference for children conditional on the same education level), and the population
ratio of ✓H over ✓L is 2/1, which is taken based on the population ratio of different sex types
that will be discussed later.
There are 21 parameters to be determined: ✓H , ✓L, ⇢,  ,  H ,  L ⌘, '0, 'M , x0,  H ,  L,  ,
 M , ↵, ⇣,  I ,  , ,  A,  D. The main strategy is that I first compute most of the parameters
from literature or data, and then solve the rest ones by quantitatively solving the model
using value function iterations to match data moments. I transform the continuous-time
model to a discrete-time one to solve the value function and use one year as the base period.
The details are as follows.
Calibration of ⇢, ⌘,  D,  A,  M . These five parameters are taken or computed directly
from literature or data. ⇢, the discount factor is set to be 0.05, as is typical in the literature.
⌘, the percentage of productivity drop due to HIV, is set to be 0.05 as Manuelli (2015) does.
For the parameters of the three arrival rates,  D is computed from female life expectancy at
birth in Kenya, which is 58.9 (World Bank, 2003-2013 average). Since the fertile age starts
from menarche the median of which is 15 (Leenstra et al., 2005),  D = 1/(58.9 15) = 0.023.
 A is computed from the mean life expectancy from the time of being HIV infected. In Africa,
the average spacing between HIV infection and AIDS is 9.4 years, and between AIDS to death
is 9 months (Morgan et al., 2002), hence  A = 1/(9.4+ 0.75) = 0.099.  M is the arrival rate
of marriage if the woman had no premarital children and chose committed sex. Of the four
categories of women the highest mean marriage age is 23.47 (group (✓L, H)). In data, this
group of women have a positive mean number of premarital children and are most likely to
have casual sex. Thus I reasonably assume the mean marriage age of committed-sex women
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without premarital children to be 24, which generates  M to be 1/(24  15) = 0.111.
Calibration of  H ,  L,  . These are parameters related to human capital accumulation
and are computed using equation (1.5) ḣ
h
=  q[1   (n1 + n2 · 1(M))](1  ⌘ · 1(I)). I use
this equation for two groups of women with high and low education efficacy ( H and  L),
and employ the average of Kenyan women’s education efficacy  ave (0.08) computed from
Schultz (2003, Table 5)14, hence obtain three equations to compute these three parameters.
I approximate the growth rate of human capital ḣ
h
of the two groups of women with the
growth rate of their labor income ẏ
y
by assuming hypothetical balanced growth path, and
proxy labor income y by wealth index from the KDHS (use data of 2003 and 2008 to compute
the growth rate)15. I use years of schooling of the two groups to compute q, and the number
of children from data for n1 and n2 of the two groups (KDHS, 2008)16.
Calibration of '0, 'M , x0. These are parameters about transfers from the sexual partner.
I first use the equation that computes the mean income transfers from nonmarital partners
14The average education efficacy  ave is computed using Table 5 of Schultz (2003) by assuming full-time
schooling education (i.e., q = 1) and no birth or HIV infection, hence  ave = ḣh . Since in my model the
source of wage differences is all human capital differences, I equal wage growth rate to human capital growth
rate. I first compute implied private wage returns in percent per annum of primary to secondary education
(8.9) and secondary to university education (16.9) using his regression coefficients, and then compute human
capital h of each education level. I normalize human capital of women with primary or lower education to
be one, then human capital of secondary education equals one plus years of secondary schooling multiplied
by the wage returns per annum from primary to secondary education computed above (hsec = 1.54), and
human capital of university education equals hsec plus years of university schooling multiplied by the wage
returns per annum from secondary to university education computed above (hunv = 2.21); finally ḣh is the
average of the growth rate of human capital from primary to secondary education and from secondary to
university education, computed using the computation results from above.
15I use wealth index (variable hv270) from the KDHS 2003 and 2008 to proxy women’s labor income. For
each year, average wealth index of more- and less-educated women (aged 15-19 for 2003, and 20-24 for 2008)
are employed to proxy average labor income of these two education groups, and then growth rate of labor
income is computed based on the increase of wealth index from 2003 to 2008 of each group. The results are
that the growth rate of income of more-educated women is 3.07 percent, and of less-educated women is 0.50
percent.
16The fraction of one’s time allocated to schooling q is computed using fraction of schooling years over a
certain period for each education group. The years of schooling is about 12 years for the better-educated
group and 6 years for the less-educated group. Assuming schooling starts at the age 7, then it ends at
ages 19 and 13 respectively for the two groups. Hence q for group  H and group  L can be computed by:
qH = (19   17)/(22   17) = 2/5, and qL = (13   12)/(17   12) = 1/5. That is, for the  H group, for the
sample used to compute income growth rate (aged 15-19 in 2003 and 20-24 in 2008) a typical woman ages
17 in 2003 and 22 in 2008, and during these five years she continued education until the age 19. For women
in the  L group, since they do not have education after age 15, I assume their income growth rate from age
12 to 17 is the same as that from age 17 to 22, and during the five years from age 12 to 17, they continued
education until the age 13.
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for all women Pr(casual) · x0 + Pr(committed) · wh'0 = 12.5% · wMhM , where Pr(casual)
(Pr(committed)) is the proportion of non-married women who have casual (committed) sex,
wM (hM) is the average efficiency wage (human capital) of men, and 12.5% is the average
fraction of a man’s income that is transferred to his nonmarital sexual partner computed
from Luke (2005). I also use the equation '0 + 'M = 1+lcM/lcF2   1, where lcM (lcF ) is the
average labor income of men (women). This equation assumes that a woman equally shares
the household income with her husband after marriage. Additionally I assume x0 to be 0.6,
which is 60 percent of labor income of women with primary education or lower per unit of
time. This number is chosen to generate reasonable proportions of two sex types consistent
with data. The data that I use for the above computation are the following. Pr(casual)
and Pr(committed) are taken from the KDHS data. However, there is no clear data about a
woman’s sex type. Greenwood et al. (2013) define casual sex as having sex with nonmarital
or non-cohabiting partner. Using their definition, I obtain the proportion of casual sex to
be 67.6 percent. But it may overestimate the proportion of casual sex type since sex with
non-cohabited boyfriend may also be committed. I therefore choose the population ratio of
✓H/✓L to be 2/1 and presume all groups except for (✓L, L) group choose casual sex, which
is relatively more consistent with the KDHS data for sex types of different groups. This
produces the proportion of casual sex to be 5/9 (or 55.6 percent, a smaller number than 67.6
percent). Women’s efficiency wage w is normalized to be one, and men’s efficiency wage wM
equals male-to-female hourly wage ratio in South Africa taken from Winter (1999). Average
human capital of women and men (h and hM) is computed using years of schooling from the
KDHS and  ave (see footnote 14), and labor incomes lcM and lcF are computed accordingly
by multiplying the efficiency wage and human capital taking labor participation rates into
account 17.
Calibration of  H ,  L. These are parameters about childrearing costs to work. I allow
17The female/male hourly wage ratio is 0.85 (Winter, 1999, Table 11), and labor participation rates of
female and male are 27.2 percent and 42.9 percent respectively (Winter, 1999, Table 3). Hence ratio of labor
income ratio lcM/lcF equals the multiplication of male/female hourly wage ratio, human capital ratio and
labor participation ratio.
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heterogeneity of   for the two different education groups  H and  L since literature shows
that better-educated people have higher demand of quality of children, hence spend more
time on childrearing for each child. I calibrate the two parameters by transforming equation
(1.2) for postmarital stage to c
y
+  n = 1 + x
y
= 1 + '0 + 'M , where cy is the consumption-
output ratio taken from PennWorld Table (6.3), and the number of children n for the two
groups are taken from the KDHS.
Calibration of ↵, ⇣,  , . These are parameters of Poisson arrival rates of marriage and
HIV infection. ↵ and ⇣ are calibrated from equation (1.6) using the mean marriage age
and the number of premarital children of the two education groups ( H and  L) and  M .
  and  are calibrated from equation (1.7) using HIV prevalence rates and the number of
premarital children of the two education groups and  I .  I is calibrated from quantitatively
solving the model using value function iterations.
Calibration of  I ,  , ✓H , ✓L. I calibrate these last four parameters by solving the model
quantitatively. I transform the continuous-time model to a discrete-time one, discretize the
space of n, n1 and h, and use value function iterations to solve policy functions of each group
of women. In particular, I use the simplex-search method to find the parameter values to
match the four targets: n and n1 of  H and  L groups, by minimizing the distance of n and
n1 of the two education groups from policy functions and data.
Table 1.6 shows the calibrated parameter values, and Table 1.7 shows the model and
targeted values of certain variables, which are matched very well. Furthermore, I simulate
HIV prevalence rates using the calibrated parameters, and obtain the HIV prevalence rate of
all women to be 8.01 percent, comparable to the data value of 9.45 percent, and the HIV rate
of young women to be 6.56 percent, very close to the data 6.96 percent 18. HIV prevalence
rates by age of the model and the data (premarital sex only, five-year moving average) are
shown in Figure 1.1. It can be seen that the HIV prevalence rate from the model is matched
to the data particularly well for young women.





In this section, I conduct counterfactual analysis to examine the effect of fertility motives
quantitatively.
The first set of experiments either turns off the channel that premarital births facilitate
marriage or alters women’s preference for children. The first experiment makes premarital
births having no effect on marriage by setting ↵ to be zero and  M equal  M of the benchmark
model excluding the multiplier of sex type (i.e.,  M =  M_BM(1+↵BMn1_BM)). The second
one chooses ✓ that makes women’s income elasticity of fertility close to that of the US19.
The third experiment sets   to be equal to ✓L so that for the group of women with low
preference for children, the disutility cost premarital fertility totally offsets the happiness
from premarital children.
Table 1.8 shows the results. It can be seen that removing the effect of premarital births
on marriage arrival rate (↵ = 0) or increasing disutility cost premarital births (  = 0.87) have
little effects on the total number of children since they do not directly affect postmarital be-
havior, while reducing preference for children (✓ = 0.55) reduces the total number of children
by about 40 percent. In all experiments, the number of premarital children (n1) is changed
significantly. When premarital children do not facilitate marriage, or when disutility cost of
premarital fertility is larger, women choose to have only about 0.7 premarital children instead
of 1.05. Premarital fertility is even lower when women have lower preference for children.
Interestingly, better-educated women are more affected in these experiments as their number
of premarital children drops more significantly than that of less-educated women, hence their
HIV infection rate also drops significantly. This suggests that even though better-educated
19The US income elasticity of fertility is -0.38, taken from Jones et al. (2008). I use the simplex search
method to find the ✓ that makes income elasticity of fertility closest to the US level, which produces the
value of ✓ to be 0.55 and income elasticity of fertility to be -0.51. The reason that I cannot find a value
of ✓ that makes income elasticity of fertility exactly equal the US level is related to the way I compute the
elasticity: there are only two groups of women with different income ( H and  L) when setting ✓ identical
for all women, and hence the income elasticity of fertility is computed only based on difference of fertility





women have fewer premarital children, their behavior and health are also deeply influenced
by fertility motives. In addition, sex type of some groups of women are changed in the second
and the third experiments. In the second one, women of (✓H , L) type choose casual sex
instead of committed sex (hence all women choose casual sex) since they are now willing to
have fewer premarital children (and fewer total children as well), and premarital children and
committed sex are complements in facilitating marriage. In the third experiment, women
of group (✓L, L) choose committed sex instead of casual sex, since now premarital fertility
is less favored, but choosing committed sex helps bringing about marriage after which they
would enjoy more children. As a consequence, HIV prevalence rates decline in all experi-
ments. HIV prevalence rates of all women drop to about 6.5 percent from 8.0 percent, and
that of young women drop even more, to about 4.4 percent from 6.6 percent.
Result 1. Had premarital births not facilitated marriage, or women’s value of children been
close to the US level, the HIV prevalence rate of young women in Kenya would have been
one-third lower.
In the second set of experiments, I look at how behavior matters for HIV prevalence. In
particular, I change the HIV transmission rate by setting  I to be one-third of its original
value, since it is argued that the large difference of HIV prevalence rate between Africa and
the western world comes from differences in transmission rates, and that the transmission
rate per partnership in Africa is about three times of that in the US (Oster, 2005). I examine
how this change of HIV transmission rate affects HIV prevalence when behavior response
is allowed or not. Table 1.9 shows the results. It can be seen that when HIV transmission
rate is lower, premarital children increase by about 30 percent when behavior is allowed
to change, and the HIV prevalence rate is reduced to about 4 percent for all women and
young women. However, when behavior is not allowed to change, that is, when the number
of (premarital) children and sex type are fixed to be the same as in the benchmark model,
the HIV prevalence rate can be reduced to 2.7 percent for all women and 2.2 percent for
young women. This suggests that even though the HIV transmission rate matters, fertility
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behavior plays a considerable role in HIV prevalence in Africa.
Result 2. Had the HIV transmission rate been two-thirds lower, the HIV prevalence rate
of young women in Kenya would have been one-third lower. But this rate would have been
two-thirds lower had sexual and fertility behavior been fixed.
Figure 1.2 and 1.3 show HIV prevalence rates by age of these experiments and the bench-
mark model.
1.5.2 Policy experiments
In this section, I conduct policy experiments of the income subsidy, the education subsidy
and the HIV treatment subsidy to examine their effects on women’s fertility choice and HIV
risk. For each type of subsidy, I experiment on sources of funding, including the internal
funding (domestic tax revenues) and the external funding (the international support). For
the internal funding, I experiment with a labor income tax and a lump-sum tax. Compared to
the lump-sum tax, the labor income tax adds a substitution effect that makes childrearing
less costly. Income affects premarital children in two opposite directions. Lower income
may reduce premarital children when children are viewed as normal goods. But it may also
increase premarital children since they facilitate marriage, and marriage brings more income.
For comparison purposes, all policy experiments are conducted on a revenue-neutral basis in
the sense the total amount of subsidy is the same across all experiments.
1.5.2.1 Income subsidy
The effect of the income subsidy is examined since in my model women’s fertility motives
largely come from income incentives – premarital fertility brings about marriage which im-
proves their income status. I conduct five income-subsidy policy experiments which differ in
the source of funding and groups of women to subsidize. In particular, the funding source can
be either the internal funding (tax revenues) or the external funding (the international sup-
port that generates a positive income effect), and women to subsidize can be either women
with lower education efficacy (hence lower education and income) or all women. For experi-
ments that subsidize only low-income women with tax revenues, I experiment with a labor
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income tax and a lump-sum tax. For the first experiment (labor income taxes, subsidizing
low-income women), all labor income is taxed with a 5 percent rate20. The total amount of
tax revenues in this experiment is used as a benchmark for all policy experiments. That is,
for other experiments, I keep the total amount of funding the same as in the first experiment
and compute the subsidy rate (and the tax rate in internal-funding experiments) to make the
total amount of subsidies (and tax revenues in internal-funding experiments) equal the total
amount of funding21. Lump-sum subsidies are applied in the income subsidy experiments22.
Table 1.10 shows results of fertility and HIV rates of income-subsidy experiments. It can
be seen that the total number of children increases in nearly all experiments. In the external-
funding experiments, women give births to more children due to the income effect, and in
the internal-funding, labor income tax experiments even more children are produced because
opportunity costs of childrearing become lower (i.e., the substitution effect dominates the
income effect).
The number of premarital children also increases in nearly all experiments, though very
slightly. For low-income women, the number of premarital children increases in the EL
experiment since more of them choose committed sex, and premarital children and committed
sex are complements in facilitating marriage. It also increases in the internal-funding, labor
income tax experiments due to lowered childrearing costs to work. For high-income women,
premarital fertility increases under the internal-funding, labor income tax policies due to
the substitution effect of tax. It also increases under the EU policy since more income
allows more high-income women to choose committed sex which, combined with premarital
children, increases the chance of marriage.
As a consequence, HIV prevalence rates decline under the external-funding policies for all
and for young women, but it increases under the internal-funding, labor income tax policies,
20Kenya’s labor income tax follows a progressive rule and the tax rates ranges from 10 to 30 percent
(Kenya Revenue Authority, 2007). I take 20 percent, the average of the tax rates, and assume one-fourth of
the tax revenue is used for income subsidy, that is, a tax rate of 5 percent.
21For all policy experiments, the simplex search method is used to find the subsidy and/or tax rate.
22The internal-funding policy experiments assume that subsidies to women are all funded by tax revenues
from women, i.e., there are no funds from men.
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though the magnitude of changes is moderate in all experiments. Figure 1.4 shows the HIV
prevalence rates by age of the benchmark model and the five income subsidy experiments.
These results suggest that the income subsidy may not be an effective means to reduce
HIV rates, because even though higher income disincentivizes early marriage and hence
premarital births, it allows more premarital children due to the income effect. Subsidizing
with external funds is more effective than with internal funds, because taxing labor income
reduces opportunity costs of childrearing that encourages women to bear more premarital
children, and the external funding has the potential of switching women’s sex type toward
committed sex.
Result 3. An income subsidy policy would have little effect on women’s premarital fertility
behavior and HIV prevalence in Kenya.
1.5.2.2 Education subsidy
The effect of the education subsidy is examined since data shows that better-educated women
have fewer premarital children, which lowers their HIV risk through the fertility channel.
Three experiments are conducted. In the first two, the subsidies are funded with labor income
taxes and lump-sum taxes respectively (i.e., the internal funding), and in the third one they
are funded with the international support (i.e., the external funding). In all experiments,
women who receive school education are subsidized proportionally to their education time
(q). The tax rate and the subsidy rate are computed so that the total amount of subsidies
(or the total amount of tax revenues) equals that in the income subsidy experiments.
Table 1.11 shows the results. It can be seen that the total number of children increases
under the IUlc policy, which is mainly due to an increase of fertility of less-educated women,
whose opportunity costs of childrearing become even lower due to the tax on their labor
income (the education time of women with lower education efficacy does not increase even
though education is subsidized, hence the only beneficiaries of this policy are women with
higher education efficacy). The total number of children decreases under the EU policy as
fewer children are given birth to by more-educated women; it decreases more in the IUls
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policy since less-educated women also produce fewer children due to the income effect.
The number of premarital children declines significantly for women with higher educa-
tion efficacy under all policies, since subsidizing education increases their opportunity costs
of having premarital children. But premarital fertility behavior of those with lower education
efficacy is inelastic to the policy (actually increases slightly in the internal funding experi-
ments, because lower income incentivizes premarital births to facilitate marriage). Women’s
sex type does not change in any of these experiments. As a consequence, HIV rates of all
women decline from 8.0 percent to 7.3 percent (a 9-percent reduction), and HIV rates of
young women decline from 6.6 percent to 5.6 percent (a 15-percent reduction). The decline
almost all comes from fertility behavior changes of women with higher education efficacy.
The HIV rate under the EU policy is slightly lower than under the IU policies. Figure 1.5
shows the HIV prevalence rates by age of the benchmark model and the three education
subsidy experiments.
These results suggest that first, education-subsidy policies are more effective than income-
subsidy policies in reducing premarital fertility and HIV rates, since they increase oppor-
tunity costs of childrearing to education. Second, with greater benefit, women with higher
education efficacy respond more to the education-subsidy policy since this policy is more
beneficial to them. Finally, the education subsidy funded by the international support is
more effective than that funded by domestic tax revenues, as the latter reduces income of
less-educated women and encourages them to bear more premarital children to facilitate
marriage.
Result 4. An education subsidy policy would reduce the HIV prevalence rate of young
women in Kenya by 15 percent, primarily driven by a reduction of premarital children by
women with higher education efficacy.
1.5.2.3 HIV treatment subsidy
This set of experiments subsidizes HIV treatment (antiretroviral therapy, or, in short, “ART”).
Again, three experiments are conducted depending on the source of funding, i.e., the internal
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funding – either labor income taxes or lump-sum taxes, and the external funding – the inter-
national support. The funding is given to all HIV-infected women for HIV treatment in the
form of lump-sum subsidies. The tax rate and the subsidy rate are computed to make the
total amount of subsidy (or tax revenues) equal to that in the income subsidy experiments.
In order to know the effectiveness of the subsidy on a patient’s health, one needs to know
the price and the effectiveness of the therapy. In recent years the price of HIV drugs have
dropped significantly and a generic copy of a triple-therapy antiretroviral costs about 300
US dollars per patient per year. This transforms to about 37.5 percent of Kenya’s GDP
per capita. Jordan et al. (2012) show that using three antiretrovirals reduced progression
to AIDS or death by about 75 percent. Since WHO recommends that, in resource-limited
settings, ART should be taken at the advanced stage of HIV (World Health Organization,
2003b), the effect of ART can be considered to lengthen an HIV patient’s life from 10 to 13
years, an 30 percent increase. This transforms to a decrease of  A, the death arrival rate
of an HIV patient, by about 23 percent. I also assume that ⌘, the productivity drop due
to the HIV infection, decreases by the same percentage as the death rate drop, because of
the improvement of life quality due to the treatment. In addition, ART is found to be an
effective way to prevent HIV (i.e., treatment as prevention), as it reduces HIV transmission
rate by about 70 percent (Baeten et al., 2012). This transforms to a reduction of  I by 70
percent23. Since the subsidy each patient receives may not be adequate to purchase the full
therapy, I make the proportion of the effectiveness of the subsidy to the effectiveness of a
full therapy equal to the proportion of subsidy received per patient to the full therapy price
per patient per year.
Table 1.12 shows results of the ART subsidy. It can be seen that the total number of
children increases under the IUlc policy, but not under other policies, since the former lowers
23Medical literature shows that when a HIV-positive person receives ART, the likelihood of HIV trans-
mission to his or her sexual partner can be greatly reduced. My paper primarily focus on women whose HIV
risk comes from intercourses with their infected partners. In this sense, I assume men are equally treated
as women who receive ART subsidy, hence the transmission rate to women declines. The more complicated
network effect of the treatment is not taken into account here.
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opportunity costs of childrearing. The number of premarital children increases under all
policies for all groups of women, since with the treatment not only is the cost of HIV risk
lower, but the risk itself is lower. Under the IUlc policy women have slightly more premarital
children than under other policies for the same reason as the difference in the total number
of children. As a result, HIV prevalence rates of all women decline by nearly 20 percent
due to the reduction of the HIV transmission rate, but HIV rates of young women do not
decline as much as under the education-subsidy policy, since women are incentivized to have
more premarital children. Internal funds with labor income tax are less effective than other
sources of funding due to the substitution effect. Figure 1.6 shows the HIV prevalence by
age in these experiments.
These experiments suggest that, by means of prevention, HIV treatment policy may be
effective in reducing HIV rates. But its effectiveness over young women may be dampened
because it encourages them to bear more premarital children.
Result 5. An HIV treatment policy would effectively reduce the HIV prevalence rate for
Kenyan women. But its effectiveness over young women would be dampened because of the
encouragement for premarital fertility behavior.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored the role of social and cultural norms regarding fertility in
women’s HIV risk in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using Kenyan women’s data, I have documented
evidence linking HIV risk with premarital fertility. I have thus constructed a lifecycle model
that relates a woman’s lifetime decisions concerning sex, fertility and education to HIV risk.
Premarital fertility decision is the key element of the model. Premarital births increase the
chance of marriage, but enhance HIV risk. I have subsequently calibrated the model based
on the DHS data for Kenya and conducted counterfactual analysis regarding fertility motives
and policy experiments of subsidizing income, education and HIV treatment.
Counterfactual experiments show that fertility motives play a substantial role in HIV
risk for women, especially young women. Had premarital births not facilitated marriage, or
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women’s preference for children been close to the US level, the HIV rate of young women in
Kenya would have been one-third lower. Policy experiments show that the education subsidy
is the most effective in reducing premarital fertility and the HIV rate of young women, by
raising the opportunity cost of premarital childrearing. The HIV treatment subsidy is the
most effective in reducing the average HIV rate of all women since it effectively prevents HIV
transmission. But it is not as effective in reducing young women’s HIV rate as the education
subsidy since it causes women to bear more premarital children. The income subsidy has
only moderate effects on the HIV rate, since more income allows women to have more
premarital children. For most types of subsidies, the external funding is the most effective,
and the internal funding with labor income taxes is the least effective in reducing HIV rates.
Overall, my results suggest that strong fertility motives in Africa impose considerable risk
on women’s sexual health, and policy makers need to take this factor into account to make
HIV intervention programs more effective.
Future research may build general equilibrium effects into the fertility-HIV model. One
channel can be that fertility behavior affects female labor supply and hence women’s wage in
the equilibrium. This in turn affects their fertility choice and hence HIV risk. Social network
effects may also be on the future agenda. The current paper primarily focuses on women, but
both genders engage in sexual activities and thus connect with the sexual network of both
partners. Policy effects may be amplified through the behavior change of multiple individuals
in the sexual network. Furthermore, the risk of infertility is an interesting issue for research,
since it may incentivize women to bear children earlier over the course of their lifecycle.
Finally, this paper emphasizes the importance of fertility motives to women’s health, but
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Chapter 2: Higher Education Expansion, Economic
Reform, and Labor Productivity
This chapter studies the impact of higher education expansion, along with economic reform
of the state sector, in the late 1990’s in China on its labor productivity. I argue that in
an economy such as China, where allocation distortions widely exist, an educational policy
affects average labor productivity not only through its effect on human capital stock, but
also through its effect on human capital allocation across sectors. Thus, its impact could be
very limited if misallocation becomes more severe following the policy. I construct a two-
sector general equilibrium model with private enterprises (PE) and state-owned enterprises
(SOE), with policy distortions favoring the latter. Households, heterogeneous in ability,
make educational choices and occupational choices in a three-period overlapping-generations
setting. Counterintuitively, quantitative analysis shows an overall negative effect of higher
education expansion on average labor productivity (by 5 percent). Though it did increase
China’s skilled human capital stock significantly (by nearly 50 percent), the policy had the
effect of reallocating relatively more human capital toward the less-productive state sector.
It is the economic reform that greatly improves the efficiency of human capital allocation
and complements educational policy in enhancing labor productivity (by nearly 50 percent).
2.1 Introduction
As a fast-growing economy, China has experienced tremendous institutional changes in the
past decades. One of these changes is higher education expansion. It is natural to think
that this educational policy improved human capital of the economy and thus contributed
to productivity growth. However, as documented by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), China has
suffered substantial productivity losses due to factor misallocation across sectors. Since
the working of this educational policy is expected to channel through a production factor –
human capital, its effects may be limited if factor misallocation may dampen the effectiveness
of the policy. In this paper, I examine how the higher education expansion policy may affect
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China’s labor productivity through its effect on human capital allocation as well as stock,
and how an economic reform may influence the role of the educational policy by triggering
more efficient allocation.
China’s nationwide college enrollment expansion policy took effect in 1999. In this year
alone, the college enrollment number reached nearly 1.6 million, an increase of 48 percent
from the previous year. The expansion continued throughout the following years, which sig-
nificantly increased China’s skilled labor stock subsequently (see Figure 2.1)24. The college
enrollment expansion was accompanied by a massive-scale economic reform of the state sec-
tor, which cut off subsidies to most state-owned enterprises (SOEs), shut down or privatized
the least productive ones, and laid off millions of excessive workers25.
Following the two policies, labor allocation of the private and the state sectors shows
a structural change. For skill-intensive industries, the private-sector employment has been
growing rapidly since 200226, whereas the state-sector employment has been relatively stable
(see Figure 2.2(a)). This is in contrast to the labor-intensive industries (see Figure 2.2(b)),
where the state-sector employment dropped significantly around 1998 due to the reform, and
the private-sector employment had a roughly linear growth. These observations illustrate
that China’s skill-intensive industries has grown faster relative to the labor-intensive ones,
and that within skill-intensive industries, the private sector has expanded more quickly than
the state sector since 2002. The latter suggests a reallocation of skilled labor toward the
24China’s college enrollment expansion is a means of the central government to “stimulate domestic demand,
promote economic growth, and alleviate employment pressure”. The policy made college education more
accessible by substantially expanding college admissions. As a consequence, the average annual growth rate
of China’s college enrollment reached over 16 percent during 1998-2010, a significant increase from 6.8 percent
during 1977 (i.e., the first year China when resumed its college admission)-1998 (see Figure 2.1(a)). The
college enrollment rate, defined as the ratio of total population being admitted to colleges to the population
taking the college entrance examination, was less than a quarter before 1999, but nearly 60 percent after
1999. See Wan (2006) and Chen (2004) for more details of the background of the policy.
25China’s economic reform of the state sector began in the mid-1990’s prior to the college enrollment
expansion, but became substantial since 1998. The SOEs, while given priority for various resources, were
generally considered to be highly inefficient with redundant employment. This situation was particularly
severe before the 1990’s reform, becoming a barrier for China’s further economic growth.
For more references of the SOE reform, see Bai et al. (2000).
262002 is the year when the first generation of college students since college enrollment expansion entered
the job market.
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private sector. The question is: which policy accounts for the structural change of human
capital allocation, and what are the implications for labor productivity?27.
Taking the observations delineated above into account, I construct a two-sector general
equilibrium model that characterizes human capital growth and allocation across sectors, in
an environment where allocation distortions exist. The key ingredients are following. (i)
Firms of two sectors – the private sector (PE) and the state sector (SOE), produce with
unskilled labor, skilled labor, and (physical) capital. SOE has lower TFP than PE, but is
subsidized in both renting capital and hiring skilled labor. (ii) Households (or, individuals,
interchangeably), heterogeneous in ability, live for three periods. They make the educational
choice of whether or not to acquire college education in the first period, and the occupational
choice of whether to work for PE or SOE in the second period upon graduating. Household
utility depends on consumption and a disutility cost from college education. (iii) Individuals’
ability matters for both choices. It affects educational choice as higher ability lowers the
disutility cost of education. It also affects occupational choice since higher ability lowers the
probability of being unemployed as a skilled PE worker (while a skilled SOE worker is never
unemployed). (iv) Finally, the college enrollment policy enters the model via an exogenous
component of the disutility cost of college education.
The model characterizes two tradeoffs regarding the educational choice and the occupa-
tional choice. For the former, going to college increases one’s labor income later in life, but
incurs a disutility cost. For the latter, a skilled worker earns higher wages in PE than in
SOE, but faces a higher layoff probability when working for PE. In equilibrium, households
are sorted into three categories by their ability: those with high ability acquire college ed-
ucation and then become PE skilled workers, those with low ability do not go to college
and become unskilled workers, and those in the middle go to college and then become SOE
skilled workers.
27This paper focuses on the growth and allocation of skilled labor (i.e., college graduates). The unskilled
labor could be affected by other factors such as growing rural-to-urban migration during this episode, which
is not of main interest in this paper.
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The college enrollment policy affects average labor productivity via two channels. One is
the “growth effect”. Higher education expansion encourages more people to go to college since
it lowers the disutility cost of college education. This increases the society’s human capital
stock and hence improves average labor productivity. The other channel is the “reallocation
effect”. Under this policy more people with lower ability become skilled workers, and many
of them would prefer working for SOE rather than for PE, since their probability of being
unemployed is higher if choosing the latter. This may reallocate relatively more skilled
workers as well as other resources to SOE and hence lowers average labor productivity.
I calibrate the model to match China’s data on wage and employment for years 1990
to 2008, and analyze the policy effects. The main results are as follows. First, the college
enrollment expansion policy in China did increase the society’s human capital stock sig-
nificantly (by nearly 50 percent). However, it reallocated more human capital toward the
less-productive state sector. Overall, the average labor productivity would have increased
by 5 percent had the college enrollment not been expanded. Second, the economic reform of
the state sector contributed significantly to labor productivity. Had there been no reform,
average labor productivity would have decreased by nearly 50 percent, as the human capital
share of the private sector would have dropped by 98 percent. Hence, SOE reform is a crucial
complement to the educational policy in enhancing labor productivity.
Related Literature
This paper is first related to the broad literature of the role of human capital in economic
growth and development (Schultz, 1961; Uzawa, 1965; Rosen, 1976; Lucas, 1988; Romer,
1990; Caselli, 2005; Hsieh and Klenow, 2010). While economic theory predicts a positive
impact of human capital on economic growth, empirical studies show substantially mixed
findings on the causal relationship (e.g., Barro, 1991; Romer, 1990a; Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil, 1992; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Bils and Klenow,
2000). Some recent studies pursue a more accurate measure of human capital or labor
quality and suggest a strong and positive role of human capital in growth (e.g., Hanushek
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and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008; Manuelli and Seshadri, 2014; Erosa,
Koreshakova, and Restuccia, 2010; Cubas, Ravikumar, and Ventura, 2015; Hanushek and
Woessmann, 2012). Others argue that the most cross-country differences in output per
worker are not driven by differences in human capital or physical capital, but are due to
differences in a residual, total factor productivity (TFP) (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare,
1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Parente and Prescott, 2000; Bils and Klenow, 2000). The
role of human capital in the economic transition is also theoretically investigated in the
literature. For example, Galor and Moav(2004) consider the replacement of physical capital
accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of growth along the process
of development. Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) emphasize the role of human capital in
pushing the economic transition from pre-industry development stage to modern balanced
growth path. Nevertheless, all these studies focus on the effect of human capital stock, but
ignore human capital allocation. The latter could account for a significant proportion of
TFP differences, since allocation distortions widely exist in many developing economies and
become a barrier to economic growth.
Country-level study is relatively few, despite its advantage in understanding important
country-specific characteristics related to economic development. Tallman and Wang’s (1994)
provide an excellent example with a case study of Taiwan. The authors assess Taiwan
government policy since the early 1950’s that stressed the importance of improving human
capital stock of its population. They argue that the endogenous enhancement of human
capital due to educational policy and improved institutions generates a “big push”. Their
work relates to my paper in that human capital policy interacts with market-oriented policies
and stimulates economic growth.
This paper is also related to the growing literature of the impact of misallocation on
aggregate productivity (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Alfaro et
al., 2008; Bartelsman et al., 2013; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Schmitz, 2001). This literature
highlights the role of resource allocation rather than the aggregate level in cross-country in-
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come differences, and argues that misallocation of resources slows down output TFP growth
for many developing countries and some developed countries. In particular, there is lit-
erature focusing on distortion and misallocation in China. For example, Dollar and Wei
(2007), Dobson and Kashyap (2006), Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), and Boyrean-Debray and
Wei (2005) document that China’s state-dominated financial system still favors financing
less-productive SOEs, which prevents the efficient allocation of capital. In their influential
article, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) investigate the impact of resource misallocation across
manufacturing firms on aggregate TFP in China and India. They find that a more efficient
allocation of resources would have contributed to manufacturing TFP gains of 30-50 percent
in China. Following this approach, Brandt, Tombe and Zhu (2013) measure TFP losses
in China’s non-agricultural economy associated with labor and capital misallocation across
provinces and sectors, and find that misallocation lowers aggregate non-agricultural TFP
by 20 percent28. However, the literature on misallocation mostly focuses on allocations of
physical capital and unskilled labor, while my paper emphasizes that of human capital, or
skilled labor. In particular, I study how an educational policy that improves human capital
stock affects human capital allocation in a distorted economy.
Finally, this paper is related to the relatively thin literature of China’s higher education
expansion. This literature, however, focuses on the impact of the college expansion on
education opportunities for subgroups of people and income inequality (e.g., Meng et al.,
2013; Li and Xing, 2010; Yeung et al., 2008; Yeung, 2013). This current paper is so far, to
my best knowledge, the first paper that evaluates the impact of China’s higher education
expansion on its labor productivity and economic development.
In summary, this paper contributes to the literature by examining the impact of higher
education expansion on labor productivity in an economy with allocation distortions. I argue
that in such an economy, an educational policy affects labor productivity not only through
28In an earlier article, Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu (2008) show that reductions in barriers to labor reallocation,
including from agricultural to nonagricultural sector, and from state to non-state sector, were important for
China’s structural transformation and growth.
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its effect on human capital stock, but also through its effect on human capital allocation
across sectors. The latter can be crucial since the policy may potentially trigger greater
misallocation and negatively affect labor productivity. I construct a theoretical framework
to analyze the effects of the educational policy and the economic reform policy. Under this
framework, households not only face educational choice between college education or not, but
also face occupational choice between the private sector and the state sector. Both choices
are affected by the government policy. I conduct quantitative analysis to decompose the
effect of each policy in China, and find that higher education expansion alone has slightly
negative effect on China’s labor productivity, and that economic reform complements the
educational policy in enhancing labor productivity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides details of the model economy,
followed by a characterization of general equilibrium in Section 3. Section 4 presents a
quantitative analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
In this model economy, there are two sectors – the private sector and the state sector.
Firms in both sectors produce with unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital. State-sector
firms have lower TFP in skilled production than private-sector firms, but enjoy a subsidy
for renting capital and hiring skilled workers. Households live for three periods. They
have perfect foresights about lifetime income and are heterogeneous in ability. They make
educational choices of whether acquiring college education or not in the first period, and
make occupational choices between the private sector and the state sector in the second
period. College education incurs a disutility cost, but increases labor income later in life.
Private-sector firms pay higher wages to skilled workers due to their higher productivity, but
may lay them off in the third period. Households’ ability affects both choices. Higher ability
reduces the disutility cost of college education, and also reduces the probability of being laid
off in the private sector.
2.2.1 Production and distortions
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There are two types of firms (one in each sector) – private enterprises (PE) and state-
owned enterprises (SOE). Both types of firms produce homogeneous goods which are the
numeraire, using unskilled labor, skilled labor and (physical) capital with a CRS technology.
Hence the number of firms does not matter. Markets are competitive except for the price
distortions described below. The production functions are:
PE : Y P (KP , HP , LP ) = vLP + AP (KP )↵
P
( (aP )HP )1 ↵
P (2.1)




where Li (H i ) is the amount of unskilled (skilled) labor employed by type i firms, and Ki is
capital used by type i firms, i 2 {P, S}. The unskilled production and the skilled production
are separate. The former is linear in unskilled labor and is the same for PE and SOE. The
latter uses both capital and skilled labor in a Cobb-Douglas form, where  (ai) is a function
of average ability of skilled workers in type i firm. Later I assume  (ai) = ai
am
, where am is
the lower bound of ability of all individuals. A Firm does not know an individual worker’s
ability but only knows the average ability of its skilled workers, hence it pays the same
wage to all of its skilled workers29. I assume AP > AS since it is widely documented that
private firms have higher TFP than state firms due to their better profit incentives, and it
is reasonable that better incentive matters more for skilled workers than for the unskilled.
The capital shares of output ↵P and ↵S are allowed to differ since the two types of firms
may specialize in industries with different capital intensities.
Policy distortions are modeled following Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) , and Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). Instead of assuming distortions of output or physical capital as in their
models, I assume that SOE receives subsidies for both renting capital and hiring skilled
workers. Denote the market rental rate of capital by R and denote the wage of an SOE
skilled worker by wSH , then what SOE actually pays out of its own pocket is (1  ⌧K)R and
(1 ⌧w)wSH respectively, where ⌧K (> 0) and ⌧w (> 0) measure the degree of policy distortions
29This form of production functions allows me to focus on human capital (or skilled labor) by greatly
simplifying the unskilled part to be identical for both types of firms.
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on physical and human capital allocations respectively. PE receives no subsidy hence pays
R for capital and wPH to its skilled workers, which may differ from wSH . Both firms pay the
same wage wL = ⌫ to their unskilled workers due to the linear unskilled production function.
2.2.2 The household
Time is discrete. The economy is populated with three-period overlapping generations, in
which households make the educational choice – whether to acquire college education when
young, and the occupational choice – whether to work for PE or SOE when becoming a
skilled worker at the middle age. I assume a household to be equivalent to an individual.
Following Fender and Wang (2003), I assume that individuals are identical, except that
they differ initially in ability, which is exogenously determined at one’s birth and remains
unchanged for her entire life. The ability a follows an i.i.d. distribution with cdf F (a) and
lower bound am. This ability affects one’s disutility cost of acquiring higher education (i.e.
going to college), and also her job security if working for the PE as a skilled worker. The
measure of those born in any particular period is normalized to unity, and individuals have
no initial wealth at birth.
All individuals derive utility from the third-period consumption. Apart from this, only
the disutility of acquiring higher education affects utility. The disutility cost of education
can be thought of as a nonpecuniary cost, i.e., how painful one feels about preparing for
the college entrance exam. There is neither endogenous leisure nor altruism. The utility







where ct+2t is her consumption at the third period of life, which is a function of her ability30.
⌦ is an indicator function which equals one if the individual chooses to go to college when
young, and zero if she does not. The disutility cost of acquiring higher education is ⌘
a
,
which consists of two components. ⌘ is the exogenous disutility cost of education, which can
30 The linear form of utility function greatly simplifies my analysis of household choices.
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be used to measure an educational policy that rations higher education enrollments, i.e., a
higher ⌘ means more restrictiveness to be admitted to a college. The individual’s ability a
negatively affects the disutility cost, i.e., people with higher ability feel less painful about
going to college.
The timeline of one’s life is as follows.
In the first period, a household decides whether to acquire higher education (going to
college). If she does, she cannot work at this period and needs to pay an education fee ✓
by borrowing from the market since she has no initial wealth; but she will become a skilled
worker from the next period on. If she doe not, she will become an unskilled worker and
receive unskilled wage for her entire life but can start working immediately.
In the second period, those who went to college when young become skilled workers and
make an occupational choice between working for a PE or SOE, and would receive skilled
wages wPH or wSH accordingly; they also need to repay their loan of education fee at a market
interest rate, i.e., (1 + R)✓. Those who did not go to college continue working as unskilled
workers. I also assume that all middle-aged households are imposed a lump-sum tax ⌧ by
the government to subsidize SOE, regardless of her educational level or job positions.
In the third period, workers cannot change their working sector. One may consider this
as that when people have been working on a particular kind of job for a long time, it would
be too costly for them to make a change, or they will be restricted to switch by institutional
factors. skilled workers of SOE are better-secured at this period than those of PE: if the
skilled works for PE, with a probability  (a) she will be laid off and become unemployed
for the rest of her life, where a is her ability and  0(a) < 0 – the higher ability she has,
the less likely she will be fired; but if she works for SOE, she keeps her job whatever. This
mirrors the reality that the SOEs usually offer better-secured, “stable” jobs to the highly
educated workers regardless of their ability, since they have less profit incentive but better
motivation to maintain a high average educational level, whereas the private firms select
workers more by their ability and are more willing to fire the “surplus” ones even if they have
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high educational achievement; moreover, private firms themselves are less-secured and are
much more likely to be shut down than the SOEs since they have little protection from the
government – in this situation, their former employees would find themselves harder to find
a new job if their ability is not high enough.
An unskilled worker will be laid off with a probability  L in this period regardless of the
type of firm she works for (this is again for simplicity and for my focus on analysis of the
skilled part). Hence, an unskilled worker would be indifferent between working for PE or
SOE and has no directed occupational choice.
Since only consumption of last period of life matters, the household saves all her income
in previous stages of life and receives interest rate r of her saving (r = R    , where   is
depreciation rate of capital). Her consumption when old (under different choices) is the
following
ct+2t,L = [wL,t(1 + rt+1) + wL,t+1   ⌧t+1](1 + rt+2) + (1   L)wL,t+2
ct+2t,H,S = [w
S
H,t+1   (1 +Rt+1)✓   ⌧t+1](1 + rt+2) + wSH,t+2
ct+2t,H,P (a) = [w
P
H,t+1   (1 +Rt+1)✓   ⌧t+1](1 + rt+2) + [1   (a)]wPH,t+2 (2.4)
2.3 Optimization and Equilibrium
2.3.1 The Household
With perfect foresights about lifetime income, households’ educational choice and occupa-
tional choice can be solved backwardly.
Occupational choice
At the second period of life (date t+1), a skilled individual (born at t) faces occupational
choice o 2 {P, S}. She chooses to work for PE if and only if ct+2t,H,P > ct+2t,H,S as the cost
of college education has been a sunk cost. By arranging equation (2.4), we obtain that a
household chooses PE if and only if (wPH,t+1 wSH,t+1)(1+rt+2)+wPH,t+2 wSH,t+2 >  (a)wPH,t+2,
that is, when the wage advantage of working for PE exceeds the expected loss of being fired
at the last period of life. The higher ability she has, the less likely will she be fired (i.e.,
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lower  (a)), and hence the more appealing is PE to her.
Under certain conditions, in particular, when relative TFP of PE to SOE is sufficiently
high, and distortions of capital and skilled labor (i.e., ⌧K ,⌧w) are not too large, so that
wPH > w
S
H , there is a threshold ability â such that a household with ability above â chooses
to work for PE and the one with ability below â works for SOE. â can be determined by:
 (â) =
⇥
(wPH,t+1   wSH,t+1)(1 + rt+2) + wPH,t+2   wSH,t+2
⇤
/wPH,t+2. (2.5)
In the steady state where prices are constant, the above equation can be simplified as








Intuitively, there is a trade-off between wage and layoff for the occupational choice. Since
PE has higher productivity, it can offer higher wage than SOE does as long as distortions
are not too large. However, the risk of layoff in the third period could be high if the worker’s
ability is too low. Hence, only those with sufficient high ability would choose to work for
PE, whereas those with low ability would rather give up higher wages to gain an “iron bowl”
in SOE.
Educational choice
At the first period, an individual (born at t), having perfectly forecasted what she would
choose in the next period conditional on her decision at this period, makes the educa-
tional choice e 2 {H,L}. She chooses to go to college and become skilled if and only if
max{E[ct+2t,H,P (a)], E[ct+2t,H,S]}  
⌘
a
> E[ct+2t,L ]. From the utility function, one can see that a
household at this stage weighs the higher wage she would receive when becoming a skilled
worker against the disutility cost of education. The lower ability she has, the more painful
would she feel about going to college, and hence the more likely would she choose to become
an unskilled worker. Under certain conditions – in particular, when ⌘ is sufficiently high and
the cost of education (disutility and fee) is not too low, there exists another threshold ability
ã so that a household with ability above ã chooses to go to college and become skilled and
those with ability below ã become unskilled. ã can be determined by
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⇥







= [wL,t(1 + rt+1) + wL,t+1] (1+rt+2)+(1  L)wL,t+2
(2.7)
In the steady state the above equation can be rearranged to
ã = ⌘/
 
wSH(2 + r)  (1 +R)✓2   wL [(2 + r)(1 + r) + 1   L]
 
(2.8)
Intuitively, equation (2.8) says that the higher the exogenous disutility cost of college
education (i.e., higher ⌘), or the smaller the wage gap between the SOE skilled worker and
the unskilled worker, the higher would be ã.
Lifetime choices by ability
Now one can see that under certain conditions, households endogenously sort into dif-
ferent categories of education and occupation by their abilities. This can be illustrated in
Figure 2.3, which shows the utility of a household with different abilities under different
choices. The utility of being unskilled is constant with respect to her ability, while of being
skilled increases in ability, with a PE worker’s utility curve being steeper than an SOE
worker’s but starting lower. As a result, households sort into different skill levels and dif-
ferent types of firms: those with abilities in high percentiles acquire college education and
then are employed by PE, those in low percentiles do not go to college and become unskilled
workers, and those in the middle go to college and become skilled SOE workers.
2.3.2 The Firm
Firms’ problems are standard. They rent capital and hire unskilled and skilled workers each
period, and do not save for the future, thus their problem is a static one. Firms optimize by
equalizing marginal product to marginal cost, taking distortions as given. Their decisions
about capital and two types of labor are (subscript t is skipped)
Capital:


















where ki ⌘ Ki
Hi
, i 2 {P, S} is the capital per (skilled) capita of each firm. unskilled wages are
the same for PE and SOE:
wL = ⌫ (2.13)
.
2.3.3 Market clearing conditions
There are three markets in this economy – unskilled labor, skilled labor, and loanable funds
market.
The unskilled labor market clearing condition at time t is
LPt + L
S
t = F (ãt) + F (ãt 1) + F (ãt 2)(1   L,t) (2.14)
The subscript t of ã indicates the threshold ability of the generation born at t.
The skilled labor market clearing condition at time t is
HPt = 1  F (ât 1) +
Z 1
ât 2
[1   t(a)]dF (a) (2.15)
HSt = [F (ât 1)  F (ãt 1)] + [F (ât 2)  F (ãt 2)] (2.16)






















H,t   (hPt 1 + hSt 1)(1 +Rt)✓t 1   ⌧t (2.17)
where lit and hit are the amount of unskilled and skilled workers of each generation born at
time t working for sector i (i 2 {P, S}). From equation (2.17), one can see that the loanable
funds demand consists of two parts: capital demand from firms and educational loan demand
from young college students; the loanable funds supply consists of: a) wages earned by young
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unskilled workers, b) wages plus interest earned by the middle-aged unskilled workers from
the last period, and their current wage, c) wages earned by middle-aged skilled PE and
SOE workers, d) minus the repayment of educational loan of the middle-aged skilled, and
e) minus the lump-sum tax raised from all the middle-aged.



























that is, it is used to subsidize SOE for renting capital and hiring skilled labor.
2.3.4 Dynamic general equilibrium
Definition: A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations {LP , LS, HP , HS, KP , KS,
c(a)}t, and a set of prices {R, wPH , wSH , wL}t, such that given prices, distortions {⌧K , ⌧W}
and distribution of ability F (a),
(i) each household chooses e 2 {H,L}, o 2 {P, S} and consumption to maximize her utility;
(ii) each firm chooses capital and labor {Ki, H i, Li}t (i 2 {P, S}) to maximize profit (by
satisfying equations (2.9)  (2.13));
(iii) labor and loanable funds markets are clearing at each time t, that is, equations (2.15) 
(2.17) are satisfied at each t.
(iv) government’s budget constraint (equation (2.20)) is satisfied.
2.3.5 Characterization of educational policy effects
As mentioned earlier, a higher education expansion policy can be measured in the model by
a decrease in the parameter value of ⌘. This section characterizes the two separate channels
through which the educational policy affects labor productivity (see Figure 2.4).
The growth effect. As ⌘ decreases, the exogenous cost of acquiring college education
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decreases, as does the overall disutility cost of education given an individual’s ability. This
encourages more individuals to go to college and to become skilled labor upon graduating,
thereby increasing the society’s stock of human capital. As the supply of skilled labor
increases, average skilled wage decreases in equilibrium, suppressing further increase in skilled
labor. By facilitating human capital growth of the economy, this channel has a positive effect
on average labor productivity.
The reallocation effect. Under the mechanism of the model, only individuals with higher
ability choose to go to college. When it encourages more individuals to acquire college
education, the college enrollment expansion policy brings more less-abled individuals to the
skilled labor market. These people would prefer working for SOE rather than PE, since their
probability of being unemployed if choosing the latter is higher. This may lead to relatively
more human capital being allocated to the less-productive SOE. The reallocation of human
capital toward SOE also tightens the loanable funds market as SOE requires more subsidies
for its skilled-worker employment and capital renting. This reduces capital per worker and
further reduces average labor productivity of high-skilled production. The relative increase in
skilled labor supply to SOE then pushes up relative PE skilled wage and interest rate (mainly
due to a higher demand of loanable funds since more subsidies are required), offsetting the
increase in SOE skilled labor supply. This channel has a negative effect on average labor
productivity since it enlarges misallocation of both human and physical capital.
2.4 Quantitative analysis
In the quantitative analysis, I first calibrate two sets of parameters of before and after policy
change using China’s data of 1990-2008, and do model dynamics by making cohort combi-
nations of decision rules under different regimes. Then several experiments are conducted to
examine the impacts of particular policies quantitatively.
2.4.1 Calibration
I calibrate two sets of parameters – before and after policy change (college enrollment ex-
pansion and state sector reform) – by taking the average value of 1990-1998 data for the
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first set, and the average of 2002-2008 for the second one. I assume these average values to
be corresponding to the old and new steady states (steady state 1 & 2) of the economy31. I
do not use data between 1999 to 2001 as I consider these years as a transition period under
the policy. Data before 1990 is quite lacking and after 2008 could be much affected by the
global financial crisis32.
I use employment and wage data of five industries from China labor statistical yearbook:
manufacturing, real estate, finance, information technology, and science and technology ser-
vice. Manufacturing is a low-skill intensive industry with the fraction of employment with
college or above degree only 6.3 percent in 2002; and the rest four are considered high-skill
intensive industries with share of employment with college or above degree over 30 percent
in 2002. Unskilled wage is taken from the average wage of construction industry of which the
higher-education composition is among the lowest of all industries (5 percent in 2002) and
remains stable over the years. In the calibration, I normalize the pre-regime mean unskilled
wage to be one, and other wages are then transformed to wage ratios.
To match the three-period OLG setting, I assume three cohorts coexist at each period
which lasts for twenty years, and population of each cohort is normalized to be one. Since
the decision of whether to go to college normally happens at around the age 15, I assume
only one-fourth population of the young cohort is active and ignore the rest three quarters
of the young cohort. So although the whole population at a certain period is 3, the “active”
population is 2.25.
Households’ ability follows Pareto distribution F (a) = 1   (a/am) ta , with the location
parameter am (minimum ability) and shape parameter ta to be calibrated. The PE skilled
laid-off probability in the third period of life is assumed to be  (a) = "a  , ",   > 0.
31Since the state sector reform became substantial in 1998, roughly the same period as the college enroll-
ment expansion, I assume these two policies to be simultaneous and thus the old steady state corresponds
to before both policy changes, and the new one corresponds to after both policy changes.
32A caveat of the calibration is that the length of data available may be too short, only less than 20 years,
while one life period of a generation in the model takes about 20 years. So in the second calibrated steady
state, a large fraction of workers are the old or middle-aged living through the first steady state and are not
able to make choices as modeled. This makes the quantitative results less convincible. Nonetheless, due to
the lack of data, the present quantitative analysis may be the best that can be done so far.
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Sixteen parameters (or variables) need to be calibrated for each steady state: r,  , ta, am,
✓, ⌫, AP , AS,  L, ↵P , ↵S, ",  , ⌧K , ⌧w, ⌘0. 33 Seven of these are assumed to be the same for
the two steady states: r,  , ta, am, ↵P , ↵S,  , and the rest can differ. Annual real interest
rate is assumed to be 3% and annual depreciation rate of capital is 4% which is normal in
the literature; tail parameter ta is assumed 2.5 in the benchmark case but changing it would
not make a qualitative difference. Education fee ✓ is 10,000 RMB yuan for steady state one
(“ss1” hereafter) and 20,000 RMB yuan for steady state two (“ss2” hereafter) from data, and
are normalized to the ratio to ss1 unskilled wage. ⌧w is assumed to be 0.68 for ss1 and 0.36
for ss234.
Now ten parameter values remain to be determined: am, ↵P , ↵S,  , ",  L, AP , AS, ⌧K , ⌘0,
of which the first four are of the same value for two steady states. I calibrate these parameters
to match the following target: (normalized) total number of skilled workers (H) and unskilled
workers (L), total SOE employment (TS), total PE employment (TP , including domestic
private firms and foreign firms)35, unemployment rate (unemp) and computed unemployment
rate of the skilled (umpH) (using the unemployment rate, skilled share of unemployment,
and skilled share of employment), fraction of new college graduates that are employed by
PE (hpfr), average wage of PE and SOE respectively (wP and wS) with non-wage benefit
adjusted for SOE wage (adj)36, and the sectoral physical capital ratio (KP/KS). The target
values are shown in Table 2.1 and the calibrated values are shown in Table 2.2.
The calibration shows several notable changes in parameter values from ss1 to ss2. First,
the measure of college enrollment restrictiveness (exogenous disutility cost of education) ⌘0 is
33Instead of calibrating ⌘ as mentioned in section 3, I calibrate the relative exogenous disutility cost of
education ⌘0 ⌘ ⌘/w̄H .
34This assumption is reasonable since before the late 1990’s state sector reform, over one-third of China’s
SOEs were taking financial losses; the total loss of SOEs is more than double of their total profit in 1998,
and total loss/total profit became about 1/8 in 2004, whereas still over one-third SOEs are loss makers. As
Bai et al. (2000) pointed out that a large number of SOEs maintain their employment of surplus workers
just as an obligation to the government and meanwhile receive subsidy for the employment. This was largely
mitigated by the SOE reform but still lasts after that.
35Since TP and TS are not normalized as in Table 2.1, I only use their relative values in the calibration.
36In particular, wS is the average SOE wage taken from China statistical yearbook, times adj, adjustment
for non-wage benefit , which is considered significant for SOE, especially before the late 1990’s reform.
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reduced from 1.220 to 0.316, by about three quarters, suggesting a large expansion of college
enrollment. Second, distortions are largely reduced: in addition to ⌧w, ⌧K is about 0.43 in
ss1 and 0.08 in ss2, decreasing by about 80%. Third, TFPs of skilled production increase
for both types of firms, especially for SOE, which increases by 83%, in line with what
literature documents for SOE productivity improvement following the reform. In addition,
the multiplier of the skilled laid-off probability function " also changes from 1.8 to 0.01,
suggesting a structural change in the labor market. This decrease in " seems not make much
sense by making it easier for the growing skilled workers to keep the job, but can be justified
in the following way: for one thing, it turns out that laid-off probabilities of the PE skilled
with lowest ability â for the two regimes are comparable, which are 0.16 for ss1 and 0.64 for
ss2 – that the latter is much larger than the former indeed fits the reality; for another, one
may also attribute the structural change to that more job opportunities in private sector are
available for the skilled in the later period37.
2.4.2 Dynamics
This section shows the model dynamics of skilled labor stock and allocation, and TFP of
skilled production , and compare the relevant results of model dynamics to those from data
or calibration.
Figure 5 (a) shows the model dynamics of skilled labor and allocation (H, HP , HS)
during my sample period. I compute the dynamics of skilled labor in the following way.
First, I extend my sample size forward to the year when the economy reaches a real steady
state predicted by the model, that is, the year 204238. I also extend backward until the
amount of skilled labor becomes nonpositive (the first year for the H to be positive is 1982).
I make the extensions to match two things in data. One is the average value of H for 1990-
37Although not explicitly illustrated here, that changes in AS , AP , and " could also be considered as
by-products of the economic reform. The reform could improve AS by closing the less-productive SOEs
and by improving profit incentives of the remaining ones; as the economy becomes more market-oriented,
restrictions imposed on private firms were loosened and economic opportunities for them became more, as
a result, AP could be improved and the job opportunities in the private sector significantly increase which
lowers ".
38Note that when I do the calibration, the post-regime period is assumed to be a steady state but not a
real one
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1998 and 2002-2008 respectively, and the other is the slope of H for 1990-1997 and 1998-2008
respectively39. Then I compute the decision rules of the beginning and the ending point of
each subperiod, that is, 1981 and 2025 for pre-regime (2025 is the year that the pre-regime
steady state would have been reached had there been no regime change), and 1998 and 2042
for post-regime. In particular, I compute the fraction of population that would choose to be
unskilled workers, skilled workers of PE and SOE. Finally, I make linear combinations of
the decisions rules of the beginning and the ending point for each subperiod according to the
model setting, and obtain H for each year40. I compute dynamics of HP by employing similar
strategies and make HS equal the difference between H and HP . Based on the dynamics of
skilled labor, that of TFP and wage can be computed from the model.
Figure 5(a) displays a structural change of H and HP around 2000, while HS is relatively
stable over the years. In addition, HP exceeds HS before 2008, which fits the data well.
Figure 5(b) shows the comparison of H of model dynamics with data (normalized). As can
be seen, the model H fits well with data with similar magnitude and growth rate.
Figure 5(c) and (d) show dynamics of AP and AS and their ratio. As can be seen, AP
grows at a stable speed through the years, while AS has a significant improvement around
1998, the economic reform year; this is also reflected in the A ratio, which drops dramatically
around 1998.
Table 2.3 compares the mean values of variables computed from model dynamics with
those from data or calibration, which turn out to be close, showing good fit.
2.4.3 Comparative statics
I do comparative statics for each of the two steady states to examine the effects of changes
39For the matching of slope, I choose 1997 as the cutoff year in data because a structural change of H
appears to occur in 1998 in data. But the separation year for the model dynamics is still 1998.
40I compute H dynamics by making combinations of decision rules at extremes instead of computing
decision rules for each cohort, which is mainly due to lack of data, i.e., in order to compute decision rule for
each cohort, I have to use data over 40 years before 1990, which is unavailable for China.
One deviation from the model when computing the H dynamics is that for the young generation, I assume
the decision-making period is the last five years of this period, say, at the age of 16-20, rather than the whole
period; this is also consistent with my calibration when I assume 1/4 of the young generation is “active” in
the economy.
57
in certain parameter values on values of the endogenous variables, such as skilled labor
employment and sector share (H, HP , HS, HP/H), skilled human capital and sector share
(HC, HCP , HCS, HCP/HC, where HC i is defined as (ai/am)H i, i 2 {P, S}, and HC ⌘
HCP + HCS), average labor productivity(APL, which is of combing unskilled and skilled
production), skilled production output share of PE (Y hp_share). The parameters under
analysis are: ⌘0, ⌧K , ⌧w, AS, AP ,  L, ✓, and ⌫ (wL). Figure B1 and B2 in Appendix B shows
the effect of percentage changes in ⌘0 and ⌧K on variables listed above (to save space, the
results of other parameter effect are not shown, and only results of the first steady state are
shown, but that of the second steady state is qualitatively similar).
Figure B1 shows that a decrease in ⌘0 (measure of college enrollment expansion) does
increase society’s skilled labor and human capital by a large amount, but most of them end
up in SOE rather than PE; the PE share of skilled labor and human capital increases when
⌘0 is large, but decreases when ⌘0 gets smaller. This inverse-U-shape feature also applies
to APL and PE output share. The downward side of APL curve is mainly due to the
two-side effect of a decrease in ⌘0: on the one hand, it increases skilled labor supply and
human capital stock, and thus improves average labor productivity; on the other hand, it
reallocates relatively more skilled labor or human capital towards SOE and thus reduces
aggregate productivity by reducing the average productivity of the skilled labor – the latter
effect dominates the former.
Figure B2 shows that a reduction in distortion of capital (⌧K) largely reduces skilled
employment as well as human capital of SOE and increases those of PE, but its effect on
total skilled labor can either be negative (ss1) or hump-shaped (ss2, not shown here). APL
increase as ⌧K decreases, as more skilled go to the more productive private sector; and the
PE output share increases. The effect of reduction of ⌧w is similar to that of ⌧K .
Though not shown here, an increase in AS increases skilled labor in SOE as well as the
overall skilled labor and reduces that in PE; it also reduces APL as relatively more skilled
workers go to the less-productive SOE. An increase in AP has the opposite effect.
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2.4.4 Counterfactual analysis
I do counterfactual analysis to examine the policy effects. In particular, I look at what
would have happened to PE skilled labor share (HP/H), total human capital stock and its
PE share (HC and HCP/HC), sectoral output share (Y PH /YH and Y SH/YH) and average
productivity of labor (APL and APLH , where the latter is the APL of skilled production),
had there been no college enrollment expansion (changes in ⌘0), no state sector reform
(changes in ⌧K , ⌧w) or no improvement of TFP (AS and AP ).
Table 2.4 shows the results. It can be seen that college enrollment expansion (a decrease
in ⌘0) did increase the society’s total human capital stock significantly, which would have
been reduced by about 48 percent had there been expansion. However, it greatly reallocated
skilled labor as well as human capital toward SOE rather than PE – the PE human capital
share would have increased by nearly 30 percent had there been no college policy. As a
result, the average labor productivity would have been increased by 5 percent, as the average
productivity of skilled labor would have increased by 213 percent.
In fact, it is the state sector reform that contributed to the private sector expansion of
skilled employment, as it greatly reduced allocation distortions (⌧K and ⌧w). Had there been
no SOE reform, the average labor productivity would have been lowered by 47 percent, as
almost all skilled labor would have been employed by SOE.
Increases in AP and AS contribute to the increase in skilled labor and human capital
shares of PE and SOE respectively as well as their output share, and have opposite effects
on total human capital and labor productivity as well.
2.4.5 Impacts of educational policy with different distortions
This section shows that the existence of allocation distortions does matter for the impact
of college enrollment expansion policy on the economy. In particular, I assess the impact of
the college enrollment expansion (changing ⌘0 from the pre-regime value to the post-regime
value) on human capital stock and allocation, sectoral share of output, and average labor
productivity, under the assumption of full distortion (pre-regime distortion level) and no
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distortion. This experiment is done under the pre-regime economy. Table 2.5 shows the
results.
It can be seen that when the economy exhibits full distortion, the college enrollment
expansion increases human capital stock by 58 percent, but reduces PE human capital
share by 25 percent. Its overall impact on APL is again slightly negative since misallocation
is intensified. However, had the economy had no allocation distortion, all skilled labor would
have been employed by the private sector and the reallocation effect of the college policy
would have disappeared. It would have increased the human capital stock by 9 percent and
improved average labor productivity by 3 percent.
One may think that the impact of college policy on human capital stock and thus aver-
age labor productivity under the no-distortion economy is moderate. I argue that it may be
reasonable given that the educational policy in this experiment is isolated from other gov-
ernment policies and technology progress that follow exogenously or endogenously with the
human capital change. In the real world, the effect of an educational policy could be larger
if it endogenously interacts with technological change and/or labor market adjustment.
2.4.6. Social optimal
This section analyzes social welfare optimization under certain constraints. In particular,
a social planner is allowed to determine college enrollment policy (⌘0) and subsidy to SOE
for skilled employment (⌧W ) to maximize utility of the society. His choice is subject to
labor market frictions (i.e., layoff probabilities), capital market distortions (i.e., ⌧K), and a
minimum SOE skilled output share41. The problem is
max{⌘0,⌧W } U = uLF (ã) +
R â




s.t. Y PH /YH > 0.376, ⌧K ,  (a),  L as in ss2.
Table 2.6 shows the results of the social welfare optimization and compare them to ss2
values. It can be seen that to achieve the optimal welfare, the government should continue
expanding higher education, until the exogenous disutility from college education is totally
41Layoff probabilities  (a) and  L, and ⌧K are set to be the same as in the second steady state; the
minimum SOE skilled output share is set to be the SOE skilled output share in the second steady state.
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removed. However, allocation distortions of high-skilled workers should be further reduced
at the same time. Under this optimal setting, the human capital share and skilled output
share of the private sector are close to those in ss2, but total human capital stock improves
by 9 percent, and APL increases as well42.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated the impact of higher education expansion on labor pro-
ductivity in a transition economy where allocation distortions exist. In such an economy, an
educational policy affects labor productivity not only through its effect on human capital
stock, but also through its effect on human capital allocation across sectors. The policy is
likely to intensify human capital misallocation, since it encourages more less-abled people to
acquire college education, many of whom may prefer to work for the less-productive sector.
The impact of the educational policy on aggregate productivity may be negative through
the reallocation channel. Within the two-sector general equilibrium framework I construct,
the educational policy can affect labor productivity by affecting both the threshold of house-
hold ability for choosing college education and the threshold ability for choosing the private
sector. I calibrate the model to match China’s data on wage and employment, and conduct
quantitative analysis to evaluate policy effects.
Quantitative results show that the higher education expansion in the late 1990’s in China,
though it did improve China’s human capital stock significantly, allocated relatively more
human capital towards the state sector rather than the private sector. Overall, the educa-
tional policy alone has a slightly negative impact on China’s average labor productivity. It
is the economic reform of the state sector that greatly reduced allocation distortions and
enhanced the positive role of higher education expansion in productivity growth. These re-
sults suggest that the role of an educational policy in shifting resource allocation should be
underscored, and that a complementary economic policy that improves allocation efficiency
can be crucial in productivity growth.
42This is also the allocation where APL reaches maximum under the same constraints.
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Chapter 3: The Regional Income Disparity in China
This chapter explores patterns of China’s regional income disparity. I document the stylized
fact that the regional labor income disparity varies across industries with different skill in-
tensities in China. While high-skill-intensive industries have larger income dispersions across
regions than low-skill-intensive ones, this pattern tends to intensify over recent decades. I
construct a model that interprets this pattern using the regional productivity variation of
high-skilled firms, match-specific ability, firms’ screening decision and workers’ migration. In
particular, firms in rich regions have higher productivity than those in poor regions. Workers
are heterogeneous in ability, which is match-specific and unobservable before screening. Since
ability and productivity are complements for high-skilled firms, these firms in rich regions
pay more screening efforts to select workers with higher ability, and pay a higher wage in
equilibrium. Workers live in different regions, and migration incurs a cost. This increases la-
bor market tightness in rich regions and amplifies the regional income disparity. The model is
quantified to match China’s data. Counterfactual analysis shows that the screening process
accounts for 45 percent of China’s regional income disparity of high-skill-intensive industries,
and migration barrier accounts for 10 percent.
3.1 Introduction
This research is inspired by the stylized fact that the regional labor income disparity varies
across industries with different skill intensities in China. While high-skill-intensive industries
have larger income dispersions across regions than low-skill-intensive ones, this pattern tends
to intensify over recent decades. This paper aims to explain this pattern.
Several measures are employed to examine the pattern of regional income disparity for
different industries and show similar results. Figure 3.1, for example, show with two of
these measures that the regional income dispersions were almost similar for all industries in
1995, whereas magnified for high-skill-intensive industries from then on, but shrank for low-
skill-intensive ones. Figure 3.2 further documents a time-series pattern of regional income
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and employment difference. First, the rich-to-poor regions’ wage ratio declined for low-skill-
intensive (L) industry to about one since the 1990’s, but increased significantly for high-skill-
intensive (H) industries over the years. Second, the rich-to-poor regions’ employment ratio
increased significantly for L industries while stays relatively stable for H industries. Finally,
within rich or poor regions, H-to-L industry wage ratio increased much more in rich regions
than in poor regions43.
The question is: why do high-skill-intensive industries have larger regional labor income
dispersions than the low-skill-intensive ones in China? And why does this pattern intensify
over the recent decades? The convergence of low-skill-intensive industries’ wages across
regions is easier to explain, which is largely due to the expansion of rural-to-urban migration
since 2000’s. Over 90 percent of those migrants are low-skilled workers, disproportionately
more of whom moved to richer provinces rather than poorer ones for better job opportunities.
But for the high-skilled workers, their migration barrier is much lower than low-skilled ones
as in many other countries, and data shows that the fraction of migration population of high-
skilled urban workers is at least comparable to that of rural workers, so migration barrier
should not be the main reason for the regional income dispersion for high-tech firms. Another
possible explanation is different (observed) characteristics of high-skilled workers, such as
education, across regions. But data shows no evidence that high-skill-intensive industries
in rich provinces have better education component of workers than the poor provinces’
counterparts, nor are their high-skilled workers graduated from better colleges or universities
(China household income project, “CHIP”, 2002).
Taking the observation delineated above into account, I construct a model that interprets
the pattern of regional income disparity of China using the regional productivity variation of
high-skilled firms, match-specific ability, firms’ screening decision and workers’ migration. In
43Rich (G) regions include eight richest provinces and poor (B) regions include fourteen poorest ones by
GDP per capita. H industries include information technology, finance and science and technological services,
and L industry is manufacturing. Wage and employment data are both weighted average of regions or
industries. In order to eliminate the effect of variation of living cost across regions, I adjust the labor income
with living costs estimated by and following the method (for years not available) of Brandt and Holz (2006).
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particular, firms in rich regions have higher productivity than those in poor regions. Work-
ers are heterogeneous in ability, which is match-specific and unobservable before screening.
Since ability and productivity are complements for high-skilled firms, these firms in rich
regions pay more screening efforts to select workers with higher ability, and pay a higher
wage in equilibrium. Workers live in different regions, and migration incurs a cost. This
increases labor market tightness in rich regions and amplifies the regional income disparity.
In addition, the model incorporates more dimensions of heterogeneity concerning regions,
areas, industries, and skill levels of the Chinese economy.
I calibrate the model to match China’s data, and conduct counterfactual analysis to
examine the effect of the screening and migration barrier on China’s regional income disparity
for high-skill-intensive industries. The main findings are the following.
(i) High-skill-intensive firms’ screening process plays a substantial role in enlarging China’s
regional income disparity but reducing regional employment gap of these industries. The
wage ratio of rich-to-poor regions for these industries would drop by 45 percent were there
no screening of ability. Meanwhile, the rich-to-poor regions’ high-skilled employment ratio
would increase by 71 percent were there no screening.
(ii) Migration barrier plays a relatively minor role in the high-skill-intensive industries’
regional income disparity, which would drop by 10 percent were there no migration cost.
Meanwhile, the rich-to-poor regions’ high-skilled employment ratio would increase by 30
percent were there no migration cost.
Related Literature
This research is mostly related to the broad literature of income or wage inequality. In
general, wage inequality between different skill groups, or skill premium, is often interpreted
by skill-biased technology (e.g., Acemoglu, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2012;
Autor and Dorn, 2013; Juhn et al., 1993) and international trade or offshoring (e.g. Sachs
and Shatz, 1998; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Helpman et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2012; Verhoogen,
2008). Within-skill-group wage inequality is explained by job mobility (Artuc and McLaren,
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2015) and searching frictions (Moen, 1997; Acemoglu, 1999; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000;
Akerman et al, 2013).
Literature on China’s regional income disparity mostly focuses on the disparity between
rural and urban areas, and between coastal and interior areas, and generally argues that the
former comes from migration barrier due to government policies, and that the latter arises
due to openness to international trade and market economy (e.g. Fan et al, 2011; Jian et al.,
1996). My paper, however, is the first work that documents the pattern of China’s regional
income disparity for industries with different skill intensities, which, to my best knowledge,
has not been explained by the existing literature.
One paper closely related to my paper is Helpman et al. (2010a) who build a new
framework to study the determinants of wage distributions, in which there is ex post match-
specific heterogeneity in a worker’s ability. In their model, more productive firms have
higher incentives to screen workers to improve the composition of their employees due to
the complementarities between workers’ ability and firm productivity. As a result, more
productive firms employ workers with higher (match-specific) ability and pay higher wages,
though the unemployment rate of such firms is higher. This framework can be partially
applied to China’s case where firms in different regions vary substantially in productivity
and thus may employ workers with different (unobserved) abilities and pay different wages.
However, it does not take into account of features of China’s economy, say, migration barrier
and the division of rural and urban workers, and of high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
In addition, the theory so far is only a static one, and needs to be extended to a dynamic
version to capture the dynamics of regional income disparity of China.
3.2 The Model
In this paper, I attempt to explain the patterns of China’s regional income disparities, in
particular, those of high-skill-intensive industries (or, high-skilled workers in these indus-
tries). Firms’ screening process is built upon the theoretical framework of Helpman et al
(2010), while more dimensions of regions, industries and areas as well as migration are incor-
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porated to capture China’s regional productivity variations, migration barrier, and division
of different groups of workers.
3.2.1 Static model setup
Production, matching and screening
There are two regions, Good region (G) and Bad region (B), where the former represents
richer, better developed regions, and the latter represents poorer, less-developed ones. Each
region has urban (U) and rural areas (R). Rural areas are assumed to be identical across
regions, while in urban areas, there are two types of industries in both regions – High-tech
industry (H) and Low-tech industry (L). Firms within each industry of each region are
ex-ante identical except for the specific ability that each H firm requires. The production
functions as follows.
H : yHi = A
H ih
↵µa (3.1)
L : yLi = A
Ll (3.2)
i 2 {G,B}, where AH and AL are industry-specific productivity, and  i is the region-specific
productivity (may capture, for example, differences in regional infrastructure); h (l) is the
number of workers in a firm of industry H (L); µa is the average ability of workers in that
specific (H) firm. So labor is the only input of production, and the H firm production
exhibits DRS, i.e., ↵ 2 (0, 1). Let
✓i ⌘ AH i (3.3)
denote the total productivity of an H firm in region i.
As we can see, worker ability is only valued in H firms. I assume there there are ex-ante
two types of workers – the high-skilled (sH) and the low-skilled (sL). The latter can only
work for L industries, and the former can work in both industries, though her ability is
not valued by L firms. I assume that all workers originally locate at rural areas have the
skill sL. Whether a worker belongs to sH or sL is public information (e.g., a sH worker can
always show a college diploma while a sL worker cannot). However, within the sH workers,
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worker ability a is match-specific and independently distributed across matches, and cannot
be observed without costs. Worker ability a is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution,
Ga(a) = 1  (am/a)k for a   am > 0 and k > 1.
The labor market of H industry is characterized by search and matching frictions which
are modeled following the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides approach. An H firm
pays a search cost of bin units of the numeraire can randomly match with n workers, where
the search cost bi is taken as given by firms and is endogenously determined by the tightness




where xi ⌘ NiPHi (Ni is the total number of matched workers of H firms in region i, PHi is the
total number of sH workers who apply to H firms in region i; the ex-post Ni = niMi, where
Mi is the mass of H firms in region i, which is exogenously fixed), b̄ > 0, and " > 0.
The match-specific ability a is unknown to both workers and firms, hence there is no
directed search; by paying a screening cost of c(ac) /  units of numeraire, where c > 0 and
  > 0, a firm can identify workers with an ability below ac.
Wages of H firms are determined by a bargaining game, which equalizes the marginal




yi(✓i, hi)  wHi (✓i, hi)hi
⇤
= wHi (✓i, hi)  w44, where w is the worker’s outside option
value, which in this setting is the wage of working for a L firm, hence w = wL. Let  i denote







L firms are identical across regions, hence wL = AL for both regions. I also assume that
all workers in rural areas earn a constant wage wR.
Migration and utility
Workers can migrate between G and B, and between U and R; however, migration is
44Since matching and screening costs are sunk at the stage of bargaining, firms and workers only bargain
upon the devision of output
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not costless. The migration cost   of a worker is drawn randomly and independently from
a distribution with cdf F ( ); for those who migrate from rural to urban area, there is an
additional barrier measured by . Hence, the total migration cost of those who migrate
between urban areas is  , and for those who migrate from rural to urban area (whatever
region) is  (1 + ). For a sH worker who wants to apply to H firms in the other region, she
has to migrate first before applying, there is no cost of applying for a job though.
Workers are risk-neutral and only value their income, hence their utility equals expected
earnings from wage minus a migration cost if incurred. A sj (j 2 {H,L}) worker with
migration cost   who is originally located at region i (i 2 {G,B}) and area v (v 2 U,R) has
the utility
u(i, v, sj, ) = E[w]  Imig[Iv=U + (1  Iv=U) (1 + )] (3.6)
where E[w] is her expected earning from wage; Imig is an indicator which equals one if the
worker migrates and zero if she does not; Iv=U is also an indicator which equals one if v = U
and zero otherwise.
3.2.2 Characterization of static model equilibrium
3.2.2.1 The Firm
The problem of L firms is easier to solve due to the linear form of production function.
Neither the number of firms nor the number of workers matters, and wage is wL = AL for
both regions.
The H firm maximizes the profit (subscript i is skipped here)
⇧ = max{ac,n}(1   )yH   c(ac) /    bn
= max{ac,n}(1   )AH (āH) h↵µa   c(ac) /    bn (3.7)










where y ⌘ kk 1a
↵k
m . Assume 1  ↵k > 0.








c)k   c(ac) /    bn (3.11)

















c)k + b (3.13)








Under certain conditions (to be determined), an increase in ✓ lead to an increase in ac,
n, h, b, and wH . Assumptions will also be made to assure that wH > wL, otherwise no one
will work for H firms.
3.2.2.2 The Workers
Workers decide whether or not to leave her original location and migrate to another region
or area. Since wH > wL and there is no cost of job application, sH workers always apply
to H firms first (and can only apply to one firm) and will work for L industry only if not
employed by the H firm.
A sH worker chooses to migrate from region i1 to i2 if and only if the expected wage
increase of working in i2 is larger than the migration cost, that is
wHi2 pi2 + w
L(1  pi2)      wHi1 pi1 + w
L(1  pi1) (3.15)
where pi1 (pi2) is the probability of being hired by a H firm in region i1 (i2).
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A sL worker originally in urban areas do not migrate since low-skilled wages are the same
across wages while migration is costly.
As assumed above that all workers originally at rural areas are low-skilled, so their
decision is whether to migration to the urban area (region does not matter in this setting).
A rural worker choose to migrate to urban area if and only if the increase of income in urban
area exceeds the migration cost
wL    (1 + )   wR (3.16)
Suppose that for sH workers, the expected wage in G is higher than that in B, i.e.,
wHG pG+w
L(1 pG) > wHB pB+wL(1 pB) (which is true under certain reasonable conditions),
and assume that wL > wR, then there exists two cutoffs of migration cost  ̂U and  ̂R such
that a sH worker originally at B migrates to G if and only if     ̂U , and a (sL) rural worker
migrates to urban area if and only if     ̂R. sH workers in G do not migrate. The two
cutoffs are determined by
 ̂U = w
H
G pG   wHB pB   wL(pG   pB) (3.17)
and
 ̂R = (w
L   wR)/(1 + ) (3.18)
3.2.2.3 The Equilibrium





and as defined above, hi is number of workers employed by each H firm in region i, Mi is the
number of H firms in region i, and PHi is total number of applicants to H firms in region i.
Let NHi0 (NLi0) denote total sH (sL) workers originally locate at i (urban areas), and NR0










Use Hi to denote the number of workers employed by all H firms in region i, and use
LA denote total number of workers in L firms of both regions, then labor market clearing
conditions are









B0  HG  HB) +NR0(1  F ( ̂R)) (3.23)
Note that the allocation of L industry workers between regions is indeterminate since
rural workers are indifferent of which regions to migrate to.
If we denote the total sH workers in region i at the end of time by NHi , the sH workers
working in L industry in region i by LHi , and the remaining rural workers by NR, then
NHi = Hi + L
H
i (3.24)
LHi = PHi(1  pi) (3.25)
and
NR = NR0F ( ̂R) (3.26)
Moreover, since all H firms within each region makes the same decision, µa is identical
for H firms within a region, and thus
āi = µai (3.27)
Definition: A static model equilibrium is a set of labor allocations {NHi , Hi, LHi , LA,
NR}i2{G,B}, a set of wages {wHi , wL, wR}, distributions of match-specific ability Ga(a) and
migration cost F ( ), such that
(i) Given total productivity ✓, regional labor market tightness b, a H firm chooses number
of workers to be matched n and lowest ability to hire ac to maximize its profit given by
equations (3.7) or (3.11), i.e., by satisfying equations (3.12) and (3.13).
(ii) Given wages, skill (sH or sL), probabilities of being hired by H firms (pG and pB, for
sH workers only) and migration cost  , a worker chooses whether or not to migrate (either
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between urban areas or from rural to urban area), satisfying equations (3.15)-(3.18).
(iii) Regional labor market tightness b is given by equation (3.4), where PHi is given by
equations (3.20) and (3.21), pi (i 2 {G,B}) satisfies equation (3.19), and āi is given by
equation (3.27).
(iv) H firm wages are determined by a bargaining process, and the share  , given by equation
(3.5), of output go to workers.
(v) Labor markets are clearing, i.e., equations (3.22)-(3.26) are satisfied.
(vi) Initial labor allocation {NHi0 , NLi0, NR0}i2{G,B} is given.
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
3.3.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model based on China’s wage and employment data for years 1993-2011. Data
of industries with different skill intensities is applied. In particular, I use manufacturing as
the low-skill-intensive industry, and weighted averages of information technology, finance,
and science and technological service as the high-skill-intensive industry. Regional differences
of living costs are adjusted following Brandt and Holz (2006). Urban and rural population
and migration data are taken from China population census. rich-to-poor regions’ high-
skilled employment ratio per firm is taken from World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Table 3.1
shows the target of calibration, and Table 3.2 shows the key parameters and variables of the
calibrated model45.
3.3.2 Counterfactual analysis
In this counterfactual analysis, I examine the effect of firms’ screening process and the
migration cost on the regional wage and employment disparity of high-skill-intensive firms.
In the first experiment, I turn off firms’ screening process, so that firms do not know
workers’ match-specific ability, while all else are the same as the benchmark model. The
high-tech firm’s production function is now yi = AH ih↵i a, where a is the average match-
specific ability of all high-skilled workers in the economy. The profit is then
Q
= maxhi(1 
45Three normalizations are made: (i) total population is normalized to 100, (ii) low-skill-intensive industry
productivity AL is normalized to 1, and so is wL, and (iii) the number of high-skilled firms in B region is 1.
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 i)AH ih↵i a  bihi, assuming firms employ all workers that they are matched with.
In the second experiment, I assume migration cost is zero for all urban population, so that
migration decision of urban workers only depends on job opportunities (i.e., wage differences
and probabilities of being employed).
Table 3.3 shows the main results. It can be seen that firms’ screening plays a substantial
role in high-skill-intensive industries’ regional income disparity and employment gap. Had
there been no screening process, the regional income disparity of high-skill-intensive indus-
try would have shrunk by 45 percent, while employment ratio of this industry would have
increased by 71 percent. The role of the migration cost is less significant. Had there been
no migration cost, the regional income disparity of high-skill-intensive industry would have
dropped by 10 percent, and the employment ratio would have increased by 30 percent.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper studies the pattern of regional income disparity in China. I document the stylized
fact regional income disparity varies across industries with different skill intensities. While
high-skill-intensive industries have greater labor income disparity across regions than low-
skill-intensive ones, this pattern tends to intensify over the past two decades. I establish
a theoretical framework that incorporates China’s regional, industrial, and workers’ hetero-
geneity and migration barrier. In particular, I interpret the larger labor income disparity of
high-skill-intensive industries by regional productivity variation of high-skilled firms, match-
specific ability, firms’ screening decision, and workers’ migration.
I calibrate the static model to match China’s wage and employment data for different
industries and regions. My counterfactual analysis shows that firms’ screening process plays
a substantial role in the regional income disparity of high-skill-intensive industries. If firms
were not able to screen workers’ match-specific ability, the regional income disparity of these
industries would be 45 percent lower, and the rich-to-poor regions’ employment ratio of these
industries would be 71 percent higher. Migration barrier of high-skilled workers, however,
plays a relatively minor role.
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Future work will concentrate on dynamics of the economy. In particular, what accounts
for the intensified pattern of regional income disparity of China remains to be answered. One
possible explanation is the agglomeration effect for firms, that is, more-productive firms tend
to relocate at richer regions to take the advantage of positive externalities of these regions,
increasing the regional productivity gap and income disparity. Directed search is another
possibility. When workers gradually learn their match-specific ability, those with high ability
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1. HIV prevalence by age: data and model
Notes: This figures shows the HIV prevalence rate of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the model and
the data. The data are from the DHS (2008) for Kenyan women.
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Figure 1.2. HIV prevalence, counterfactual experiments: fertility motives
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence rate of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the benchmark
model and the three counterfactual experiments regarding fertility motives.
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Figure 1.3. HIV prevalence, counterfactual experiments: behavior change
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence rate of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the benchmark
model and the counterfactual experiments regarding behavior change.  I is set to be one-third of its original
value (i.e.,  I = 0.0024), and its effect on HIV rates is examined when behavior response is allowed or not.
“Behavior” means behavior change is allowed, and “no behavior” means behavior is fixed to be the same as
in the benchmark model.
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Figure 1.4. HIV prevalence, income subsidy
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence rate of all women by age (15-49) from the benchmark model and
four income subsidy policy experiments. “inc IL” is the result of the income subsidy funded by the internal
funding and subsidized only to less-educated women. “inc IU” is the result of the income subsidy funded by
the internal funding and subsidized uniformly to all women. “inc EL” is the result of the subsidy funded by
the external funding and subsidizing less-educated women. “inc EU” is the result of the subsidy funded by
the external funding and subsidizing all women. The subscript “lc” means internal funding is raised from
labor income tax, and the subscript “ls” means internal funding is raised from lump-sum tax.
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Figure 1.5. HIV prevalence, education subsidy
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the benchmark model
and two education subsidy policy experiments. “edu IU” is the result of the education subsidy funded by
the internal funding and subsidized to all women. “edu EU” is the result of the education subsidy funded
by external funding and subsidized to all women. The subscript “lc” means internal funding is raised from
labor income tax, and the subscript “ls” means internal funding is raised from lump-sum tax.
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Figure 1.6. HIV prevalence, treatment subsidy
Notes: This figure shows the HIV prevalence of all Kenyan women by age (15-49) from the benchmark model
and two HIV treatment subsidy policy experiments. “ART IU” is the result of the education subsidy funded
by the internal funding and subsidized to all HIV-infected women. “ART EU” is the result of the education
subsidy funded by external funding and subsidized to all HIV-infected women. The subscript “lc” means
internal funding is raised from labor income tax, and the subscript “ls” means internal funding is raised from
lump-sum tax.
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(a) College entry number (in million)
(b) Relative urban employment with college degree
Figure 2.1. College enrollment expansion
Notes: This figure shows the college enrollment number (in million) of China during 1990-2010 (Panel(a))
and the share of urban employment with college degree (Panel(b)).
Data source: http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0503/c116076-21359059.html
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(a). Employment of skill-intensive industries (in million)
(b). Employment of labor-intensive industries (in million)
Figure 2.2. Industry labor allocation
Notes: This set of figures shows employment (in million) of the state sector and the private sector for four
skill-intensive industries (Panel (a)) and four labor-intensive industries (Panel (b)) during 1990-2010. The
Solid line represents the private sector, and the dotted line represents the state sector. Data is taken from
China labor statistical yearbook.
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Figure 2.3. Lifetime choices by ability
Notes: This figure shows an individual’s utility (vertical axis) as a function of ability (horizontal axis) when
she chooses to be an unskilled worker (uL), a PE skilled worker (uPH) and an SOE skilled worker (uSH).
Under the model mechanism and reasonable parameterizations, individuals whose ability is higher than a
threshold â choose to be PE skilled workers, those whose ability is lower than another threshold ã choose to
be unskilled workers, and those whose ability is between ã and â choose to be SOE skilled workers.
89
Figure 2.4. The effect of higher education expansion
Notes: This figure shows the channels that the higher education expansion policy affects labor productivity
(APL). One channel is through the “growth effect”, that is, higher education expansion reduces disutility
cost of college education and encourages more people to acquire college education. The other channel is
through the “reallocation effect”, that is, by admitting more less-abled people to college, a larger proportion




Figure 2.5. Model dynamics
Notes: This set of figures shows the results of model dynamics. Figure (a) shows the normalized number
of skilled workers (H) and that for two sectors (HP , HS) from model dynamics. Figure (b) compares the
number of skilled workers of model and data. Figure (c) shows model dynamics of TFPs of the two sectors’




Figure 3.1. Regional income disparity for different industries
Notes: This figure shows China’s regional income disparity using two measures: (a) coefficient of variation
of labor income across provinces for different industries, and (b) the ratio of labor income of provinces
which engage more in international trade to those which engage less for different industries. The horizontal
axis represents industries ordered by their skill intensity (larger number means higher skill intensity).The
industries are ordered as follows: manufacturing ; construction; resident services and other services; wholesale
and retail trade; traffic, transport, storage and post; accommodation and restaurants; real estate; culture,
sports and entertainment; information transfer, computer service and software; finance; scientific research,
technical service and geologic perambulation.




Figure 3.2. Regional income and employment: 1993-2011
Notes: Figure 3.2(a)-(c) shows China’s regional income and employment during 1993-2011. (a) shows G-to-
B wage ratio for H and L industries, (b) shows G-to-B employment ratio for H and L industries, and (c)
shows H-L wage ratio within G or B regions. G includes eight richest provinces and B includes fourteen
poorest ones by GDP per capita. H includes IT, finance and science and technological services, and L is
manufacturing. Wage and employment data are both weighted average of regions or industries. In order
to eliminate the effect of variation of living cost across regions, I adjust the labor income with living costs
estimated by and following the method (for years not available) of Brandt and Holz (2006).
Data source: China labor statistical yearbook.
93
Table 1.1 Summary statistics
HIV prevalence rate
all women 7.98%
young women (age 15-24) 4.55%
edu: primary or lower 8.54%
edu: secondary or higher 6.91%
% of women who have premarital births 24.60%
% of women who have premarital pregnancy 47.40%
average number of children
edu: primary or lower 5.38
edu: secondary or higher 3.35
average number of premarital children
edu: primary or lower 1.19
edu: secondary or higher 0.74
average first marriage age
edu: primary or lower 19.26
edu: secondary or higher 22.17
% of women who have secondary/higher education 33.63%
average years of schooling 7.70
Notes: Data are from the DHS for Kenya (2008). This table deserves more explanations. First, HIV
prevalence rates listed are for all women aged 15-49, but women who have premarital sex are more relevant
to the context of this paper (the fraction of this group is about 87 percent of all women). Their HIV rates
are higher than the average rates of all women. For these women, HIV rates are 9.45% for all of them, 6.96%
for young women, 10.15% for the less-educated, and 8.17% for the better-educated. Second, the number of
children and premarital children, and the age at the first marriage the average of women aged 35-40 who had
premarital sex from the KDHS (2008). The reason for choosing this age cohort is that for younger women,
they may continue to have more children and will be married in the future if not yet, so including them does
not well capture women’s life profile of marriage and fertility; for older women, their marriage and fertility
may be very different from a typical woman on average due to cohort effects. Third, education level and
years of schooling are for women aged 25 or older, since younger women may not have finished education yet.
Finally, all statistics are sample-weighted using weights provided in the DHS. Most of the variable values are
used as targets in the calibration section.
The number of premarital children is computed in the following way. The DHS contains information of
women’s age at the first union and at the first child birth, and the current age of all living children. Using
this data I compute women’s age at the birth of each child, and then the number of (living) children born
before their first marriage. Note that here birth ages are transformed to pregnancy ages.
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Table 1.2. Premarital births and HIV infection
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (2003, 2008). The logistic model is used for regressions.
Coefficients displayed are transformed to marginal effects computed at the sample mean. The dependent
variable is a woman’s HIV test result (1 if positive, and 0 if negative). Prembth is computed using a woman’s
age at the first birth of her child and her age at the first union (1 if a woman’s first child was born before
her first marriage, and 0 otherwise). Edu is a dummy of a woman’s education level. urban is a dummy
of whether a woman lives in an urban area. Ln_NoPartners is a woman’s number of lifetime partners
in logs. Occupation is a dummy of standardized respondent’s occupation groups. WealthID is the wealth
index of a woman’s household ranging from 1 to 5 (poorest to richest). No_wife is the number of wives of
a woman’s husband, and wife_rank is the woman’s rank among her husband’s wives. Region is the region
where a woman lives (dummy). Y ear is the year of the survey (dummy). Cohort is a dummy of a woman’s
birth year. Age is a woman’s age the time of survey. Ethnicity and Religion are dummies of a woman’s
ethnic and religious groups. Age at 1st union is a woman’s age at her first union (marriage). Knowledge is
a woman’s knowledge about contraception methods and HIV prevention methods (dummy).
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 1.3. Subsample 1 – premarital sex
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (2003, 2008). I restrict the sample for regressions
to women who had premarital sex. The logistic model is used for regressions. Coefficients displayed are
transformed to marginal effects computed at the sample mean. The dependent variable is a woman’s HIV
test result (1 if positive, and 0 if negative). All the independent variables are the same as in Table 1.2.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 1.4. Subsample 2 – non-commercial sex
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (2003, 2008). I restrict the sample for regressions to
women who are not involved in commercial sex. The logistic model is used for regressions. Coefficients
displayed are transformed to marginal effects computed at the sample mean. The dependent variable is a
woman’s HIV test result (1 if positive, and 0 if negative). All the independent variables are the same as in
Table 1.2.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 1.5. Education, wealth, and premarital births
Notes: Results are from the DHS for Kenyan women (1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008). The logistic model is
used for regressions. The dependent variable is a woman’s premarital birth (1 if she has a premarital birth,
and 0 if not). All the independent variables are the same as in Table 1.2, except for ln_eduyear, which is a
woman’s years of schooling in logs, and sexage, which is a dummy of a woman’s age at her first sex.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 1.6. Parameter values, lifecycle model
Tastes ✓H = 1.34, ✓L = 0.87, ⇢ = 0.05,   = 0.25
Childrearing cost  H = 0.25,  L = 0.16
Human capital accumulation  H = 0.16,  L = 0.04,   = 0.72
Transfers from the partner '0 = 0.13, 'M = 0.60, x0 = 0.60
HIV productivity drop ⌘ = 0.05
Arrival rates
 M = 0.11, ↵ = 0.35, ⇣ = 0.74
 I = 0.0072,   = 3.79,  = 0.077
 D = 0.023,  A = 0.0985
Notes: This table reports the calibrated parameter values of the lifecycle model.
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Table 1.7. Calibration results, model and targeted values
Model Target
Total number of children
nH 3.20 3.35
nL 5.37 5.38







HIV prH 7.94% 8.04%
HIV prL 8.04% 11.31%
Notes: This table reports the values of eight variables from the calibrated model and the target. The targeted
values are based on the DHS (2008) for Kenyan women.
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Table 1.8. Counterfactual analysis: fertility motives
BM ↵ = 0 ✓ = 0.55   = 0.87
n 4.64 4.62 2.73 4.62
n1 1.05 0.73 0.60 0.68
n1H 0.79 0.23 0.00 0.01
n1L 1.18 0.98 0.90 1.02
HIV pr 8.01% 6.50% 6.65% 6.49%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 4.35% 4.47% 4.40%
HIV prH 7.94% 5.79% 5.79% 5.80%
HIV prL 8.04% 6.85% 7.10% 6.85%
schange  L ! 0  L ! 1
Notes: This table reports the results of the counterfactual analysis regarding fertility motives. n is the
total number of children per woman. n1 is the number of premarital children per woman, n1H (n1L) is the
number of premarital children per more-educated (less-educated) woman. HIV pr is the HIV prevalence rate
of all women (aged 15-49). HIV pryoung is the HIV prevalence rate of young women (aged 15-24). HIV prH
(HIV prL) is the HIV prevalence rate of more-educated (less-educated) women. schange is the change of sex
type, where  i ! s means more women of education group i choose sex type s. Column one shows the
variable values from the benchmark model, and column two to four show the results of the four counterfactual
experiments.
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Table 1.9. Counterfactual analysis: behavior change
BM Y ES NO
n 4.64 4.62 4.64
n1 1.05 1.40 1.05
n1H 0.79 1.03 0.79
n1L 1.18 1.58 1.18
HIV pr 8.01% 4.03% 2.71%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 4.27% 2.23%
HIV prH 7.94% 3.85% 2.70%
HIV prL 8.04% 4.13% 2.72%
Notes: This table reports the results of counterfactual analysis regarding behavior change.  I is set to be
one-third of its original value (i.e.,  I = 0.0024), and its effect on HIV rates is examined when behavior
response is allowed or not. The variables reported in this table are the same as in Table 1.8. Column one
(BM) shows variable values from the benchmark model. Column two shows the results when behavior change
is allowed, and column three shows the results when behavior is fixed to be the same as in the benchmark
model.
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Table 1.10. Policy experiment, income subsidy
BM ILlc ILls EL IUlc EU
n 4.64 4.79 4.64 4.71 4.81 4.71
n1 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.05
n1H 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.80
n1L 1.18 1.19 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.18
HIV pr 8.01% 8.11% 8.01% 7.75% 8.11% 7.68%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 6.72% 6.56% 6.28% 6.72% 6.18%
HIV prH 7.94% 8.07% 7.94% 7.94% 8.07% 6.97%
HIV prL 8.04% 8.13% 8.04% 7.66% 8.13% 8.04%
schange  L ! 1  H ! 1
Notes: This table reports the results of the income subsidy policy. The variables reported in this table are
the same as in Table 1.8. Column one (BM) shows the variable values from the benchmark model. Column
two (ILlc) shows the results of the income subsidy funded by the internal funding (labor income tax) and
subsidizing only less-educated women. Column three (ILls) shows the results of the income subsidy funded
by the internal funding (lump-sum tax) and subsidizing only less-educated women. Column four (EL) shows
the results of the subsidy funded by the external funding and subsidizing less-educated women. Column
five (IUlc) shows the results of the income subsidy funded by the internal funding (labor income tax) and
subsidizing all women uniformly. Column six (EU) shows the results of the subsidy funded by the external
funding and subsidizing all women.
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Table 1.11. Policy experiment, education subsidy
BM IUlc IUls EU
n 4.64 4.72 4.58 4.62
n1 1.05 0.92 0.92 0.91
n1H 0.79 0.37 0.36 0.37
n1L 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.18
HIV pr 8.01% 7.37% 7.37% 7.32%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 5.68% 5.67% 5.59%
HIV prH 7.94% 5.91% 5.89% 5.91%
HIV prL 8.04% 8.13% 8.13% 8.04%
Notes: This table reports the results of the education subsidy policy. The variables reported in this table are
the same as in Table 1.8. Column one (BM) shows the variables values of the benchmark model. Column
two (IUlc) shows the results of the education subsidy funded by the internal funding (labor income tax)
and subsidizing all women. Column three (IUls) shows the results of the education subsidy funded by the
internal funding (lump-sum tax) and subsidizing all women. Column four (EU) shows the results of the
education subsidy funded by external funding and subsidizing all women.
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Table 1.12. Policy experiment, HIV treatment subsidy
BM IUlc IUls EU
n 4.64 4.74 4.58 4.62
n1 1.05 1.28 1.28 1.28
n1H 0.79 0.96 0.94 0.95
n1L 1.18 1.45 1.45 1.45
HIV pr 8.01% 6.60% 6.49% 6.49%
HIV pryoung 6.56% 5.98% 5.85% 5.85%
HIV prH 7.94% 6.42% 6.23% 6.23%
HIV prL 8.04% 6.69% 6.62% 6.62%
Notes: This table reports the results of the HIV treatment subsidy policy. The variables reported in this table
are the same as in Table 1.8. Column one (BM) shows the variables values of the benchmark model. Column
two (IUlc) shows the results of the treatment subsidy funded by the internal funding (labor income tax) and
subsidizing all HIV-infected women. Column three (IUls) shows the results of the treatment subsidy funded
by the internal funding (lump-sum tax) and subsidizing all HIV-infected women.Column four (EU) shows
the results of the treatment subsidy funded by external funding and subsidizing all HIV-infected women.
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Table 2.1. Target values of calibration
Notes: This table reports the targeted values for calibration. Data is taken from China labor statistical
yearbook, average of 1990-2008. H (L) is normalized total number of skilled (unskilled) workers. TS (TP )
is the total SOE (PE) employment. unemp is the unemployment rate, and umpH is the unemployment rate
of the skilled workers computed using the unemployment rate, skilled share of unemployment, and skilled
share of employment. hpfr is the fraction of new college graduates that are employed by PE. wP (wS) is
the average wage PE (SOE), and wL is unskilled wage (normalized to be one in ss1). adj is the non-wage
benefit adjusted for SOE wage.
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Table 2.2. Calibration results
Notes: This table reports the calibration results. It shows the calibrated values of parameters and variables
for the pre-regime (ss1) and post-regime (ss2) economies.
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Table 2.3. Model dynamics vs. data/calibration
Notes: This table reports the variable values for model dynamics. Average values of pre-regime (1990-1998)
and post-regime (2002-2008) economies are reported for skilled wage ratio (wH ratio), TFP ratio (A ratio)
and TFPs of the private and the state sector (AP , AS). The average annual growth rate of human capital
during 1990-2008 is shown in the first row. Values from model dynamics and from data or calibration are
reported.
108
Table 2.4. Counterfactual analysis
Notes: This table reports the results of counterfactual analysis. It shows values of skilled workers’ share
of the private sector (HP /H), total human capital stock (HC), human capital share of the private sector
(HCP /HC), skilled output share of the private sector (Y PH /YH) and the state sector (Y SH/YH), average
labor productivity of skilled output (APLH) and of all output (APL). The first two columns show variable
values of the two steady states, and column three shows percentage change of variable values from ss1 to
ss2. Column four to seven show percentage changes of variable values from ss2 if there was no ⌘0 change, no
⌧K and ⌧W change, no Ap change or no AS change.
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Table 2.5. Impacts of college enrollment expansion under different distortions
Notes: This table reports the results of the impact of college enrollment expansion with different distortions.
The variables reported are the same as Table 2.4. Values reported are computed from the model with pre-
regime ⌘0 and post-regime ⌘0 (and the percentage change of the two values) with full distortion (i.e., ⌧K and
⌧W equal to ss1 values) and no distortion (⌧K and ⌧W equal to 0).
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Table 2.6. Social optimal
Notes: This table reports the results of the social optimal exercise and compare them to steady-state 2
values. It shows variables values of total society’s utility (U), ⌘0, ⌧W and others the same as in Table 2.4.
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Table 3.1. Target for calibration
Target Value Data source
wHG /w
L 4.11 CLSY, Brandt and Holz (2006)
wHB /w
L 2.06 CLSY, Brandt and Holz (2006)






(G,H) mig ratio 0.13 CSY, CPC
E[ ]/wU 2 Dix-Carmeiro(2014) estimate:1.4  2.7
mig/popR 0.17 Cai(2010), NBS, CSY
Notes: This table shows the main target for calibration and data sources. While the names of other variables
are the same as those in the model, the last three variables deserve clarification. (G,H) mig ratio is the
fraction of H industry workers in G region who migrated from B region. E[ ]/wU is the ratio of mean
migration cost to mean urban workers’ wage. Dix-Carmeiro(2014) estimates job mobility costs ranges from
1.4 to 2.7 times annual average wages in Brazil, hence I take 2 as a proxy for my model. mig/popR is the
ratio of rural migrant workers to total rural population.
Data source: CLSY: China labor statistical yearbook. CSY: China statistical yearbook. CPC: China
population census. WBES: World Bank enterprise surveys (China).
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Table 3.2. Parameters and variables of the calibrated model
param./var value definition
↵ 0.2 power of h in prod. assumed
b̄, " 0.82, 1.5 multiplier & power(ass.) of b (matching cost) function.
am, k 1, 2.5 location & shape param. of Pareto. assumed.
c,   8 multiplier(ass.) & power of screening cost function.
 G,  B 2.70, 1 regional prod. of G, B(normalized).
AH , AL 6.73, 1 H, L (normalized) industry prod.
acG, acB 1.57, 1.05 cutoff ability of H
bG, bB 0.80, 0.35 matching cost per worker
nG, nB 9.20, 2.03 No. of matched workers (normalized total population 100 & MB = 1)
hG, hB 3, 1.8 No. of (skilled) workers per firm
 G,  B 0.21, 0.28 share of output to workers in H firm
yG, yB 59, 13 output per H firm
⇧G, ⇧B 29, 5.8 profit per H firm
   1.15 st. dev of log  distribution
 ̂U ,  ̂R 0.47, 0.41 cutoff migration cost of B urban workers, and of rural workers
 0.31 rural migration barrier
Notes: This table shows the key parameters and variables of the calibrated model.
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Table 3.3. Counterfactual analysis
benchmark no screening no migration cost
wHG /w
H
B 2.00 -45.08% -9.97%
HG/HB 1.22 70.56% 29.64%
Notes: This table shows the results of two counterfactual experiments. The first one turns off screening
process, and the second sets the migration cost to zero. It shows percentage changes of the wage and




A. Chapter 1: Evidence
This appendix provides more details about the Evidence section of Chapter 1.
Data is taken from Kenyan DHS surveys, which cover five years: 1989, 1993, 1998, 2003,
2008. The last two surveys contain results of HIV tests of a randomly selected subsample
of the normal surveys. For regressions I use data from 2003 and 2008 surveys if HIV test
results are needed and all years’ data otherwise. Below I explain the regression model and
data.
Premarital births and HIV
The hypothesis is that premarital births increase HIV infection probability by increasing
unprotected premarital sexual activity. I use the logistic probability model for regression.
HIVi =  0 +  1prembthi +  2Xi + "i
where the dependent variable HIVi is a dummy which equals one if a woman i’s HIV test
result is positive, and zero if it is negative. Prembthi is a dummy computed by the author
which equals one if a woman i’s first child was born before her first marriage, and zero oth-
erwise. Xi is a set of control variables including women’s age and cohort, living area and
region, ethnicity, religion, age at the first marriage, education, knowledge about contracep-
tion and HIV prevention, number of partners, occupation and wealth. A detailed description
of variables is as follows.
HIV : is the dependent variable. It is the HIV test result of a randomly selected sub-
sample of the normal sample of the DHS. The corresponding DHS variable is hiv03.
Prembth: is a dummy variable which equals one if a woman’s first birth was before the
first union (marriage). It is computed using the DHS variable v212 (age at the first birth)
and v511 (age at the first union).
Edu: is a dummy variable of a woman’s education level, including no education, primary
school, secondary school, and higher. I add this variable since education level may affect
both premarital fertility and HIV infection through its effect on sexual and fertility behavior.
The corresponding DHS variable is v106 (highest education attended)
Urban: is a dummy variable that equals one if a woman lives in an urban area and zero if
in she lives in a rural area. The corresponding DHS variable v102 (type of place of residence
where the respondent was interviewed as either urban or rural).
Region: is a dummy variable of a woman’s living region that includes eight provinces
in Kenya. The corresponding DHS variable is v101 (region in which the respondent was
interviewed).
I use urban and region variables because sexual and fertility behavior may vary across
urban/rural areas and regions due to variations of culture, customs, ethnicity and religion.
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Y ear: is a dummy variable of the year of the survey.
Birthyear: is a dummy variable of a woman’s year of birth. This variable is used to
capture women’s cohort effects. The corresponding DHS variable is v010 (year of birth of
the respondent).
Age: is the age of the respondent at the time of survey. Age2 is also included in regres-
sions. The corresponding DHS variable is v012.
I use year, birthyear, age and age2 since both fertility behavior and HIV prevalence may
change over the years and cohorts, and may follow a quadratic pattern over the lifecycle.
Ethnicity: is a woman’s ethnicity. The corresponding DHS variable is v131.
Religion: is a woman’s religion. The corresponding DHS variable is v130.
I include ethnicity and religion variables since these cultural factors have great influences
on women’s premarital sexual and fertility behavior and HIV status (see the background
section).
Age at the first union: is a woman’s age at her first union (marriage). It is included
because the age at marriage may be associated with premarital fertility. A woman who
is married later may have more premarital births due to the lengthened spacing between
menarche and marriage, but may also have fewer premarital children since premarital births
facilitate the arrival of marriage. The age at marriage may also affect HIV status as studies
show that delayed marriage is linked to higher HIV infection rate through an increase of
premarital sex. The corresponding DHS variable is v511.
Contraception knowledge: is a dummy variable of a woman’s knowledge about any con-
traception method classified into modern, traditional and folkloric methods. The correspond-
ing DHS variable is v301.
HIV prevention knowledge: is a dummy of whether a woman knows always using con-
doms during sex would reduce their chance of getting AIDS. The corresponding DHS variable
is v754CP .
I include Contraception knowledge and HIV prevention knowledge since they affect
both HIV transmission and fertility outcome.
In some regressions, I also add the following control variables.
Occupation: is a dummy variable of the standardized respondent’s occupation groups in
ten categories. I add this variable because women’s sexual behavior and fertility outcome
may be influenced by their occupation. The corresponding DHS variable is v717.
ln_NoPartners: is a woman’s lifetime number of sexual partners in logs. I use this
variable to control sex style of a woman (more partners implies more casual sex conditional
on other variables) which is correlated with both HIV status and premarital fertility. The
corresponding DHS variable is v836.
WealthID: is a dummy variable of household wealth index ranged from one to five
representing wealth status from poorest to richest. The corresponding DHS variable is
hv270.
No_wife: is a dummy variable of the number of other wives a woman’s husband cur-
rently has. The corresponding DHS variable is v505.
Wife_rank: is a dummy variable of the rank of a woman among the partner’s wives.
The corresponding DHS variable is v506.
I use wealthID, No_wife, wife_rank variables to proxy a woman’s wealth before
marriage. By assuming assortative matching, wealth status of a married woman’s household
116
implies her wealth status before marriage. But this implication may not be correct if the
woman enters a polygyny, i.e., she married a rich man but her rank among the wives is low.
Hence I also include the number of wives and one’s rank among the wives to better proxy
her wealth status before marriage.
For subsample regressions, I use the age of the first sexual intercourse (the DHS variable
v525) to identify premarital sex, and use the variable that asked with whom the woman had
sex (v767a, v767b, v767c) to identify those who had commercial sex.
Education, wealth and premarital births
I again use logistic model with the following specification.
prembthi =  0 +  1edui +  2wealthi +  3Xi + "i
where prembth is defined in the same way as in the previous section. For edu I use two
measures. One is education level, and the other is the number of schooling years (in logs).
For wealth I use wealth index, the number of wives of one’s husband and her rank among the
wives to proxy her wealth status before marriage. Xi represents control variables, including
women’s age and cohort, living area and region, ethnicity, religion, age at the first marriage,
age at the first sex, knowledge about contraception and HIV prevention and occupation. A
detailed description of variables is as follows.
Prembth: is the dependent variable and is defined in the same way as in the previous
regression.
Edu: there are two measures of education. One is education level which is the same as
in the previous regression. The other is years of schooling in logs (ln_eduyear), using the
DHS variable v133 (education in single years).
WealthID, No_wife, wife_rank: these are used to proxy a woman’s premarital wealth
status.
Urban, region, year, birthyear, age, age2, ethnicity and religion: these variables are
included since a woman’s living area, age, cohort, and ethnic and religious background may
affect both her education/wealth and premarital fertility behavior. The definition of these
variables is the same as in the previous regression.
Age at the first union, Contraception knowledge and HIV prevention knowledge: are
included since they may be correlated to both education/wealth and premarital fertility.
They are defined in the same way as in the previous regression.
Sexage: is a dummy variable of a woman’s age at her first sex. Literature shows that a
woman’s age at her sex onset is associated with her education level, and it also affects her
premarital fertility since earlier sex onset may result in earlier pregnancy. The corresponding
DHS variable is v525 (age at first sexual intercourse).
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B. Chapter 2: Comparative statics
Figure B1. Comparative statics of ⌘0
Notes: This set of figures shows the results of comparative statics of percentage decreases in ⌘0.
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Figure B2. Comparative statics of ⌧K
Notes: This set of figures shows the results of comparative statics of percentage decreases in ⌧K .
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